“And Her Heart Fluttered”: The Psychopathology of Desire in the Argonautika by Simons, Julia
1 
 
 
“And Her Heart Fluttered”: 
The Psychopathology of Desire in the Argonautika 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julia Simons 
 
A thesis 
submitted to Victoria University of Wellington 
in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Classics 
 
2014 
School of Art History, Classics and Religious Studies 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frontispiece: Medea contemplating the death of her children, from the House of the 
Dioscuri: Pompeii, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. Gurd (1974), fig. 2. 
3 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to extend my greatest thanks to Dr. Mark Masterson, my supervisor, whose advice 
and guidance was much required and appreciated. 
I would also like to thank my parents for their support and unwavering belief in me. 
Thank you as well to Alex Wilson and James McBurney for their help.  
A special thanks goes to James McLaren for constantly supporting and encouraging me. 
 
4 
 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the way that Apollonios constructs Medea’s psyche and body in 
response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to portray 
realistically the way that erōs manifests itself in Medea as both sickness and mental 
illness. Apollonios delves into Medea’s psyche and exposes how it functions in 
moments of intense desire, pain, indecision and introspection while under the powerful 
sways of erōs. Medea’s erōs manifests as erratic and dangerous behaviour and 
crippling indecision, the analysis of which is done in light of Chrusippos’ discussion of 
Euripides’ Medea’s akrasia. Apollonios draws from Euripides’ version to depict Medea 
in a different stage of her life, making a similar life-altering decision: whether or not to 
help Jason and betray her family or stay at home and watch him die. Apollonios makes 
the audience sympathize with Medea by showing her as a victim of destructive erōs 
and by exhibiting her emotional suffering. He heightens the degree that the internal is 
depicted and the very fact that he does internalize Medea shows an interest in her side 
of the story. It humanizes her to see her motivations, her fears, her desires and her 
moral dilemmas. Apollonios twists the image of Medea that an audience may expect to 
see by focusing, in Book 3 at least, almost entirely on her maidenhood and her struggle 
between exercising maidenly shame and giving in to the temptation of Jason. 
Apollonios makes the audience understand and sympathize with Medea by delving into 
the workings of her psyche and explaining her pleasure and pain, and most importantly, 
explaining why she cannot act rationally. erōs also manifests itself inside Medea and in 
turn this is expressed in Medea’s outward appearance as medical symptoms, like those 
of fever. In addition, by incorporating contemporary medical discoveries like the 
nervous system Apollonios is able to utilize the new conceptions of sense-perception to 
realistically show the way that destructive emotions manifest themselves as perceivable 
physical pain. Apollonios draws on philosophical and medical influences to heighten 
the realism of Medea’s physical and psychological pain and pleasure while 
simultaneously providing a forceful warning of the destructiveness of erōs’ nature.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis, I look at the way that Apollonios constructs Medea’s psyche and 
body in response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to 
portray realistically the way that erōs manifests itself in Medea as both sickness and 
mental illness.
1
 Apollonios does this to heighten the realism of Medea’s physical and 
psychological pain and pleasure while simultaneously providing a forceful warning of 
the destructiveness of erōs’ nature. Apollonios delves into Medea’s psyche and exposes 
how it functions in moments of intense desire, pain, indecision and introspection. It is 
these moments, when time stands still and Apollonios gives his audience a snapshot of 
how erōs is manifesting inside Medea and what the effects of this are, that are of 
interest to this thesis. Apollonios successfully creates these moments of realism through 
drawing on and adapting medical and philosophical texts in his descriptions. This 
symbiosis of medicine and poetry creates astounding realism and he provides 
psychologically and physically real models of anguish that are universally relatable to 
both an ancient and modern audience. In Book 3 of the Argonautika the topic of desire 
saturates the plot and even though the extent to which Apollonios discusses erōs and 
used medical and philosophical terminology is unprecedented, his antecedents are 
important to consider as understanding them will allow the reader to better understand 
the scope of Apollonios’ innovations.  
Apollonios builds his Medea on the foundations that other authors have already 
laid and to view the Argonautika in the light of them, highlights the innovations he 
makes. The invocation to Eratō at the start of Book 3 signifies a change in focus 
towards the topic of erotic love. In the Hellenistic Period, the muses which in the 
Classical period granted the poet a direct vision to help actualize the myth in his 
production were now embodied in the numerous scrolls (including philosophic and 
medical) housed in the library of Alexandria to which Apollonios had unprecedented 
access.
2
 So, Apollonios’ muses are the countless works available to him and it is 
through the utilization of them that he constructs his own vision of love. Apollonios’ 
                                                   
1 In this thesis, my preferred translation for psukhē is ‘mind’ or ‘psyche’ rather than ‘soul’ because in the 
Hellenistic Period psyche performed mental functions. In doing this I follow Graver (2007) 23: ‘the 
Greek word psyche refers in physical terms to the entire stretch of pneuma present in a human, it is 
commonly used in a more restricted way - to refer to that centralized portion of pneuma which is 
responsible for what we would call the psychological functions’. In my transliteration of Greek to 
English I try to represent the Greek truthfully, however on occasion convention prevails.  
2 González (2000) 284. 
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innovations are best viewed in light of these earlier treatments of erōs from which he 
gained inspiration. Firstly, the archaic poets understood the emotional and physical 
hold that desire can have on a person, and it is in their works where we see the mixed 
nature of Erōs’ power.3  Sappho herself coined the oxymoron pikros-glukos ‘bitter-
sweet’ to describe the dichotomy that erōs embodies. On the one hand it is irresistible, 
and the gratification of it feels great, but on the other hand, erōs is painful and 
destructive and the lasting effects deadly. Sappho also used vocabulary with a medical 
flavour to bring a heightened realism to her moments of love-frustrated pain (fr. 1). 
Apollonios heightens this pikros-glukos dichotomy by describing in great detail 
Medea’s painful and pleasurable sensations realistically according to contemporary 
models. In addition, he places an emphasis on the psychological pain that Erōs, as the 
child of Aphrodite and Ares, causes, as he incites both desire and strife – two very 
destructive things.
4
 In tragedy, the depiction of pathē (passions) only becomes more 
negative and depictions like Euripides’ Medea provide powerful warnings to society 
about the dangers of pathē, especially in women. Philosophically, erōs as a pathos 
comes to inhibit rationality and even decision-making. In advancing the theories of 
Plato and Aristotle, in the Hellenistic Period the Stoics, the largest and most influential 
school of the period,
5
 were the most strongly adverse to the passions (desire and anger 
being the primary two) and believed that they ultimately caused strife in one’s personal 
life. Apollonios too, in his descriptions of desire in the Argonautika makes strife a 
consequence of people acting irrationally upon their desires. Apollonios’ work seems 
the culmination of the evolution of erōs in literature as well as the evolution of erōs in 
philosophy and medicine and thus represents a unique Alexandrian perspective.  His 
depiction of erōs is truly unique in comparison to previous productions through the 
interior focalization and realism that he creates in portraying Medea’s pathos as it 
affects her psyche and body. Through exposing the terrifying effects of this he vilifies 
his oulos erōs (destructive desire) to the extreme.  
Apollonios introduces Erōs in his anthropomorphic god-form to show him to be 
desirous, malicious and power-hungry. Erōs’ role as god is to represent the destructive 
nature of erōs in the cosmos and this destructive nature, which is then transferred into 
                                                   
3 For example, Anacreon’s Erōs steps over heads and hits someone with a ball (fr. 358); Calame (1999) 
15; Cyrino (1996) 371. 
4 cf. 4.1165-7: ‘Never do we tribes of suffering mortals tread with whole foot upon the path of delight; 
there is always some bitter grief to accompany our joys.’ Hunter (1993) 106; Zanker (2004) 19. 
5 Long (1974) 107. 
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Medea’s heart, takes up residence to manifest as the cause of Medea’s erratic behaviour 
and bodily sickness. He is first introduced at 3.114ff after Aphrodite, at the appeal of 
Hera and Athena, supplicates him to bewitch Medea to make her fall in love with 
Jason.
6
 He is called mad (μάργος) and rejoices in his ill-gotten victory over Ganymede 
(3.119-20).
7
 His madness, greed, impudence and shamelessness (3.93) are transferred 
to Medea.
8
 Aphrodite is able to persuade Erōs to shoot Medea with his bolt of love 
through bribery, offering him the golden ball
9
 which Zeus was given when he was a 
child. It is through the description of this ball that Erōs’ cosmic significance is revealed 
(3.129-144). For the ball is constructed along the lines of the astronomer Aratus’ (c. 
315-240 BC) cosmic sphere,
10
 and as such it represents the universe and the mortal 
realm. The fact that the universe is a coveted toy (μείλιον) for the malevolent boy is a 
frightful image indeed. This ball was Zeus’ plaything as a child, and in visual arts when 
Zeus is depicted with a ball it symbolizes his power over the universe.
11
 Accordingly, 
Erōs’ association with the ball here, transfers to him some kind of cosmic role. To find 
Erōs in a cosmic role we must go to Empedocles (a poet-philosopher 490-430 BC).12  
Apollonios draws on Empedocles’ model of the cosmos and the relationship that exists 
in it between the cosmic forces of love (φιλότης) and strife (νεῖκος) and appropriates 
the qualities of philotēs to his erōs. 13  Interestingly, Apollonios presents an 
Empedoclean cosmos through the lens of Aristotle’s’ criticisms: Aristotle amends 
Empedocles’ theory, and states that instead of under the forces of increasing neikos in 
                                                   
6 Aphrodite touches her son’s jaw which is both a natural motherly gesture and a gesture of supplication 
(Arg 3.128). See Vergil’s parallel scene where he calls Aphrodite a supplex (Aen 1.666); Hunter (1989) 
111. 
7 cf. Alcman 58. 
8 Calame (1999) 15. 
9 For Erōs playing with a ball see Anacreon 5; for later passage see Meleager, AP 5.214. Erōs and Cupid 
are also represented playing with a ball in art, where the ball symbolises their universal power (cf. LIMC 
III 1.914, 987; Eur, Hipp 126-81); Hunter (1989) 113. 
10 Globes were a common apparatus in the ancient world associated with astronomers, and these became 
so common that the authors of the introductions of didactic astronomical works assumed that their reader 
had one at hand. Apollonios clearly draws on Aratus’ work, and the verbal echoes of the two passages 
are poignant. See Pendergraft (1991) 97-100 and Hunter (1989) 114. 
11 This ball was given to Zeus by his nurse Adrasteia who represents the inevitability of fate which her 
name also denotes. This is transferred to erōs, in the form of the inevitability of his presence in people’s 
lives; Pendergraft (1991) 96. Kyriakou says that the ball/cosmos symbolizes the complete surrender of 
the cosmic elements to philotēs and by means of the sympathy between cosmic and human level. It also 
foreshadows that Medea will eventually surrender to the love it causes; Kyriakou (1994) 316.  
12 Erōs also has a cosmic role in Orphic writings and rites and his cosmic role evokes the Φιλότης in the 
cosmos of Empedocles and Lucretius’ Venus, which emphasise the role of love as a guiding force in the 
universe, and its importance as a force of attraction, fertility and life; Pendergraft (1991) 101. It is this 
image which Apollonios so greatly disturbs.  
13 The ‘cosmogony-theogony’ that Orpheus sings in Book 1 before the expedition takes off (1.498-511) 
resembles the cosmos of Empedocles.  In this song, out of philotēs which encompasses everything comes 
a νεῖκος ὀλοόν (destructive strife) (1.498); Kyriakou (1994) 309. 
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the cosmos, it is under the forces of increasing philotēs in the cosmos that destructive 
things on earth happen.
14
 One of the consequences of this philotēs is the generational 
violence which it engenders. This generational violence is confirmed in Book 4, when 
Medea helps to kill her brother Absurtos in order to escape with Jason safely.
15
 
Apollonios addresses Erōs: 
Σχέτλι' Ἔρως, μέγα πῆμα, μέγα στύγος ἀνθρώποισιν,  
ἐκ σέθεν οὐλόμεναί τ' ἔριδες στοναχαί τε γόοι τε,  
ἄλγεά τ' ἄλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπείρονα τετρήχασιν·  
δυσμενέων ἐπὶ παισὶ κορύσσεο δαῖμον ἀερθείς  
οἷος Μηδείηι στυγερὴν φρεσὶν ἔμβαλες ἄτην. (4.445-49) 
Wretched Erōs, great curse, greatly hated by men,  
from you came deadly strifes and grieving and troubles,  
and countless other pains you swirl up on top of these. 
Rear up, daimōn, against the children of my enemies 
just as you did when you threw hateful ate into Medea’s mind.16 
Here Apollonios blames Erōs for Absurtos’ death more so even than he blames 
Medea and Jason.
17
 Such an emotional outburst from a narrator is uncharacteristic of 
Apollonios and is representative of his own feelings about Erōs.18 Here, the narrator, 
recognizing the overwhelmingly destructive power of Erōs, reflects Jason and Medea’s 
interest in self-preservation which they exercise in sacrificing Absurtos, and tries to 
deflect the forces of Erōs onto others.19 In doing this he shows the universality and 
inevitability of pathē. The author’s reprimand of erōs is reminiscent of a Stoic’s desire 
to be apathēs (without passions) because pathē lead us away from virtue and are thus 
dangerous to both individuals and to society. In fact, Apollonios’ address to Erōs is 
rewritten from Aratus’ Phaenomena. Phaenomena 15 calls Zeus a ‘great wonder, a 
great advantage to humanity’ (Χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ) and 
                                                   
14 De Caelo 280a11ff; Kyriakou (1994) 310. 
15 Another consequence of the dominance of philotēs in the cosmos according to Empedocles is the birth 
of monstrous, disfigured human-animal creatures (fr. 52, 140). In Book 4 Kirke does not turn her lovers 
into pigs or lions or wolves, as in Homer (Od 10. 212-213, 238), but into monsters, born from primeval 
slime, that combine both human and animal features (4.672ff); Kyriakou (1994) 309. 
16  All translations of the Argonautika are mine, unless stated otherwise. The edition I am using is 
Apollonios of Rhodes: Argonautika Book III, Hunter (ed. & comm.) (1989). cf. 4.1165 which is another 
example of the ambiguity of erōs in the Hellenistic Period; Zanker (2004) 19. cf. Jason refused to let 
Atalanta join the voyage because he is aware of the dangers of love (1.769-73). 
17 Dyck (1989) 461. 
18 Hunter (1993) 117. 
19 In addition it is an apopompē which is a prayer that an ill-doing spirit will do harm to someone else 
instead of oneself; Byre (1996) 10-11.  
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Apollonios reworks this for his very negative admonition of Erōs20 to contrast the order 
and stability that Zeus brings to the cosmos directly with the strife and discord that Erōs 
brings. Erōs, as an anthropomorphic symbol of the pathos desire, uses the subduing 
force of this emotion over humankind and manifests as psychological and physical pain 
in people and ultimately the dissolution of the values of society. Apollonios’ Erōs 
deserves no veneration; he is destructive, delights in the suffering of others and covets 
the ball/cosmos to be merely his plaything. The lives of the people who inhabit it are 
meaningless and subject to his every whim. Pathē permeate life and harm it on both the 
cosmic and the biological plane. As a consequence of philotēs Medea is transformed 
from a happy, pious girl and obedient daughter into a cold-blooded murderess of her 
brother, and later (as is known to the audience because of the mythic tradition) her own 
children.
21
 The tragedy of Medea’s mythic tradition allows Apollonios to foreshadow 
the longevity of the destructiveness of giving way to pathē. Medea acts this way 
because erōs has manifested itself in her and it has altered and affected her psychic 
make-up so much that she acts passionately and temperamentally. erōs as pathos 
pushes people and drives them beyond their limits, destroying the normal bounds of 
friendship and family.
22
 
It is under this negative light which Apollonios creates, that we must view love, lust 
and desire in the Argonautika. Apollonios presents the effects of desire by making the 
anthropomorphised, cosmic Erōs manifest in Medea as the pathos which exhibits itself 
as impassioned irrational behaviour and physical sickness. This thesis analyses these 
effects and the cause that Apollonios presents for their manifestation. Apollonios uses 
Erōs’ attack on Medea to facilitate the entrance of Erōs to the biological plane in order 
that he may proceed with his investigation into Medea’s nosology. The transformation 
of Cupid to gadfly and then to archer, whose arrow penetrates the skin,  is the means by 
which Erōs manifests in Medea as physical and mental illness.23 Erōs, in acting like a 
                                                   
20 Mori (2005) 227. 
21 Kyriakou (1994) 315. 
22 Mori (2000) 77. Apollonios provides his audience with just such an example in the Lemnians’ society, 
as the very fabric of their moral and judicial systems are destroyed by the erōs that the goddess sends 
(1.609ff). 
23 Erōs manifests itself as disease and madness which the image of the gadfly implies. The application of 
the concept of a gadfly to Erōs can be seen as early as Simonides (fr. 541. 6-11) and the image remains 
popular in the Hellenistic period. cf. Euripides, Hippolytus 1298-1303; Plato, Phaedrus 240c6-240d4; 
Theocritus, Syrinx 13-20; Adaeus, Anthologica Palatina 7. 51. 1-3; Callimachus, Hecale fr. 301. The 
incorporation of Erōs as a winged figure also allows for Apollonios to effortlessly transition him into a 
winged gadfly and then into the physical manifestation of disease in Medea. The gadfly traditionally 
brings pestilence and madness to humans through its sting.  The implication of the gadfly would have 
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gadfly takes on its associations of causing madness and fever. In this aetiological role 
in mental disease and sickness, Erōs acts as a daemonic force,24 disrupting human life 
arbitrarily and unexpectedly and without any regard for human suffering. Apollonios is 
the only author to incorporate both the gadfly and the winged archer image in Erōs’ 
description and the effect is piercing and results in an emphasis on the psychological 
instability, physical disease and hopelessness of the situation that Medea will find 
herself in:
25
 
 
Τόφρα δ' Ἔρως πολιοῖο δι' ἠέρος ἷξεν ἄφαντος,  
τετρηχώς, οἷόν τε νέαις ἐπὶ φορβάσιν οἶστρος  
τέλλεται, ὅν τε μύωπα βοῶν κλείουσι νομῆες.  
ὦκα δ'  ὑπὸ φλιὴν προδόμωι ἔνι τόξα τανύσσας  
ἰοδόκης ἀβλῆτα πολύστονον ἐξέλετ'  ἰόν.  
ἐκ δ' ὅ γε καρπαλίμοισι λαθὼν ποσὶν οὐδὸν ἄμειψεν 
ὀξέα δενδίλλων· αὐτῶι δ' ὑπὸ βαιὸς ἐλυσθείς 
Αἰσονίδηι, γλυφίδας μέσσηι ἐνικάτθετο νευρῆι,  
ἰθὺς δ'  ἀμφοτέρηισι διασχόμενος παλάμηισιν 
ἧκ' ἐπὶ Μηδείηι. τὴν δ' ἀμφασίη λάβε θυμόν· 
αὐτὸς δ' ὑψορόφοιο παλιμπετὲς ἐκ μεγάροιο  
καγχαλόων ἤιξε· βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρηι 
νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίηι φλογὶ εἴκελον. ἀντία δ' αἰεί 
βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καί οἱ ἄηντο 
στηθέων  ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτωι φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην 
μνῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερηι δὲ κατείβετο θυμὸν ἀνίηι· 
                                                                                                                                                    
been more than clear to an ancient audience as it brought pestilence and disease to ancient communities, 
and in literature it had clear links to the incitement of insanity; metaphorically, οἶστρος is a sting that 
drives people mad (Il 22.297-301). The gadfly attacks heifers in the springtime and its victims flee in a 
mad panic. Hera famously transformed Zeus’ lover Io into a heifer and caused a gadfly to endlessly 
bother her, pursuing her relentlessly as she wandered helpless from land to land (Aeschylus, Suppliants 
299-301, Ps.Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 577-582).  The mention of the gadfly recalls Herakles and his 
erotic-driven anguish when Hylas is stolen by the nymph (1.1265-9). In the recollection of Herakles’ 
experiences, the audience is prepared for a similar effect to happen in Medea. Apollonios reverses the 
gadfly image however, as here the gadfly stings the one who will become the lover, not the one who is 
the beloved, like Io; Matone (1999) 55.  Erōs as gadfly not only brings sickness and insanity, but he 
incites dangerous and powerful desire in his victim, this makes him more dangerous. The victim will 
become the active pursuer of love. For a discussion on how Medea shows dominance in her pursuit of 
Jason through gestures see Ojennus (2006). 
24 On pottery daimones were depicted as attacking their victims from above or behind, usually winged. 
Daimones are associated with sudden and mysterious ‘incursions of divinity into the observable order, 
especially those which bring about good or ill fortune’: a daimōn is temperamental and potentially 
malevolent. In Archaic Greek culture the appearance of afflictions like disease, powerful emotions and 
erratic or negative mental states were thought to be because of some kind of divine intrusion, like a 
daimōn. This is because these phenomena were otherwise unexplainable (e.g., epileptic seizures were 
still thought in the Classical period to be a divine affliction; Hippocrates, Morb. Sacr 7. 17-18, 13).  The 
early philosophers’ contribution to the discussion slowly turned the interest into explaining disease in 
terms of natural internal causation (like the imbalance of internal fire, pneuma, and the humors) rather 
than because of divine interference; Holmes (2010) 46-53.  
25 Erōs appears as an archer in 5th century vase painting and in tragedy, e.g  Euripides, Hippolytus 530ff.   
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ὡς δὲ γυνὴ μαλερῶι περὶ κάρφεα χεύετο δαλῶι 
χερνῆτις, τῆι περ ταλασήια ἔργα μέμηλεν,  
ὥς κεν ὑπωρόφιον νύκτωρ σέλας ἐντύναιτο,  
ἄγχι μάλ' ἐζομένη· τὸδ'  ἀθέσφατον ἐξὀλίγοιο 
δαλοῦ ἀνεγρόμενον σὺν κάρφεα πάντ' ἀμαθύνει·     
τοῖος ὑπὸ κραδίηι εἰλυμένος αἴθετο λάθρηι 
οὖλος ἔρως· ἁπαλὰς δὲ μετετρωπᾶτο παρειάς 
ἐς χλόον, ἄλλοτ' ἔρευθος, ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο.  (3. 275-298) 
 
Meanwhile Erōs flew unseen through the bright air,  
moving busily like the gadfly which attacks young heifers 
and which herdsmen call ‘myops’. He quickly arrived at the  
foot of the doorpost to the chamber and having strung his bow,  
he selected from his quiver a new grief bringing arrow. 
From there, he swiftly crossed the threshold, unseen, peering  
sharply around. He crouched down low by Jason, fitted  
the arrow-notch to the bowstring, and stretching the bow far back in his 
two hands, he shot straight at Medea. Speechlessness seized her psyche. 
And Erōs, rejoicing with a mocking laugh, darted back out of the high-
roofed palace; but his arrow burned deep in the girl’s heart  
like a flame. Medea kept casting bright-glances sideways at Jason, 
and her heart fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness. She thought 
of nothing else, and her heart flooded with sweet anguish.  
As when a woman heaps up twigs around a raging brand, 
a poor woman whose livelihood is spinning,  
so that she can have light in her house at night, 
crouches near the fire. A fierce flame conflagrates from a small one,  
and the raging fire consumes all the kindling together. 
Just like this destructive erōs crouched unseen, blazing in  
Medea’s heart. At one moment her cheeks drain pale, at another they 
flush red, the control of her mind now gone.  
Apollonios uses the image of Erōs as archer to emphasise the asymmetry in the 
relationship between hunter and prey,
26
 god and mortal,
27
pathos and victim, and to 
draw parallels with the Homeric world of martial action.  Apollonios models much of 
Erōs’ descent on Pandaros’ passage in the Iliad (Il 4.116-26). He transfers martial 
language to the language of love because in Book 3 of the Argonautika it is erōs, not 
war which is the main theme. Erōs poses all the danger of a warrior, and the effects of 
love are just as painful as battlefield wounds. Love is strife and strife causes physical 
                                                   
26 The arrow that threatens Menelaus is also likened to a fly, however the goddess swats it easily away 
and it poses none of the overwhelming power over its target that Erōs’ arrow does. Medea is utterly 
helpless against the god’s attack; she does not even see it coming. 
27 Pandarus too, is used as a pawn by the other gods; Lennox (1980) 65. 
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pain.
28
 Apollonios uses the arrow as the physical object to complete the transformation 
on the narrative level from the ‘seen’ to the ‘felt’ in order to describe this pain and the 
feelings associated with it.
29
 It is through the arrow’s penetration of the skin that erōs 
metaphorically transfers to Medea where it seen through its physical effects, not its 
physical presence as archer. Apollonios draws on Homer for this idea as Apollo in 
Book 1 of the Iliad brings pestilence with his arrows.  His presence is not known from 
the noise he makes or from his appearance before the camp, nor even by the arrows that 
he shoots, but by the disease that ensues.
30
 At lines 16.792ff he uses his arrows once 
again, this time against Patroklos to stun him and make him vulnerable to the Trojan 
onslaught. Apollo’s attack does not draw blood, as an arrow is wont to do but results in 
an internal interruption. He penetrates the barrier between what Holmes calls the ‘seen’ 
and enters the realm of the ‘felt’. This passage is the earliest one to suggest that human 
beings have another barrier, different to the boundary of skin that can be transgressed.
31
 
It became the job of later philosophers to understand exactly what this boundary was 
and how it worked. The arrow serves, both in Homer and in Apollonios, as a marker to 
demonstrate the line between the hidden god and the victim and also to track the 
relationship between the cause and effect.
32
 
In order for Apollonios to translate his action from the physical to the emotional 
plane Erōs must attack Medea silently, unseen and unexpectedly, like an archer.33 Erōs, 
like an archer, approaches Medea secretly and unobserved (λαθών ) which is the way 
that gods approach mortals.
34
 However, this is not that way that immortals engage 
mortals, simply because of the asymmetry of the positioning; it is not a fair fight.
35
 Nor 
is Medea’s battle with her pathos a fair fight in this respect. Through the intrusion of 
                                                   
28 Erōs’ passage is also a reworking of Iliad 1.382ff where Apollo brings the plague upon the Greek 
armies and Apollonios, through the archer image once again emphasises the sickness that Erōs will 
create in Medea. 
29 The arrow takes the place of Erōs’ traditional means of overcoming his victims which is through his 
gaze. cf. Pindar, Pyth 10.59ff; Ibycus fr. 287); Calame (1999) 20. 
30 Holmes (2010) 49. 
31 Holmes (2010) 42. 
32 Generally in epic, warfare is face-to-face, there is a mutual seeing of one-another, an exchange of 
words, and sometimes of weapons. The archer was often considered cowardly, as he attacked from an 
unseen vantage point. The ideal of engaging in face-to-face combat is further emphasized by the fact that 
warriors accrued shame if they received a wound in the back, as it was a sign of flight e.g. Il 13.184, 
17.305); Holmes (2010) 49-50. 
33 Lennox (1980) 68. 
34 cf. λαθών Il 15.540-42.  
35 cf. Il 15.540–42, 7.242–4, 13.352, 16.184; Od 4.92. The archer’s superiority of vision is also often 
stressed and the victim is left glancing around frantically for the attacker, as Medea indeed does (cf. Il 
13.649); Holmes (2010) 50. 
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the arrow Erōs transforms conceptually into the emotion erōs.36  Erōs now burns deep 
in Medea’s heart unseen (λάθρῃ). This signifies the transition from the physical ‘seen’ 
realm to the emotional ‘felt’.  Apollonios is henceforth uninterested in the 
anthropomorphic figure of Erōs, only his abstract state ‘desire’ and the effects it has.37 
The path of the arrow also represents the movement from the divine to the human 
plane, as thereafter Medea’s anguish is almost entirely dealt with on a human 
psychological level.
38
 This is further signified by the fact that desire is usually referred 
to in the plural, Erōtes rather than erōs, which implies the emotion rather than the 
figure.
39
 Apollonios incorporates both the epic tradition of divine intervention as the 
cause of mortal disease and madness, and medical and philosophical leanings toward 
natural causation in his construction of Medea’s nosology to create a symbiosis of old 
and new. After Erōs’ intervention, all of Medea’s sufferings are described in 
psychological terms, and the divine is disregarded. Apollonios uses medical concepts to 
explain how erōs disturbs Medea’s psyche and physiological make-up to manifest as it 
does. This is in itself a departure from Homeric tendencies, as he focuses on the who, 
what and why, not the how.
40
 The lyric poets, like Apollonios had a huge interest in the 
effects of emotions, and one of Apollonios’ innovations is that he adds the discussion 
of how they interact with Medea to produce those effects.  He delves into the internal 
realm, the realm of the unseen and the unknowable in order to explain, along medical 
and philosophical terms, the effects of love. This highlights his place in history and 
reflects the importance the ancients placed on symptomology in identifying cause from 
effect, not effect from cause. 
This thesis also focuses on effects of Medea’s desire and the causes behind how 
they manifests. Chapter One discusses Medea’s psychopathology, which is the study of 
the pathē and how they affect the psyche. It discusses the way the erōs as a pathos 
manifests in Medea and affects her psychology. Apollonios constructs his Medea’s 
very psyche according to a Stoic model and in accordance with this her pathos acts as a 
Stoic pathos when interacting with her psyche. Erōs affects Medea’s very ability to 
function mentally, it impedes her ability to receive and process information, and to 
make rational decisions. Apollonios uses this framework for his exposition of Medea’s 
                                                   
36 Hunter (1989) 131. 
37 Beye (1982) 127. 
38 Lennox (1980) 47. 
39 Beye (1982) 127. 
40 Holmes (2010) 44. 
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love-induced indecision as well as engaging in the philosophical discussion of akrasia. 
Erōs compromises Medea’s very psycho-somatic make-up by creating disturbances in 
her overall pneumatic tension and goading Medea into an already established 
disposition: weak-will. This weak-will causes her to act in the opposite way that she 
should and assent to be with Jason, betray her family and homeland and eventually help 
to kill her brother.  
Chapter Two discusses Medea’s patho-physiology, which is the study of disease 
and how it alters the human body (phusis). In particular, this chapter looks at how the 
pathos manifests in Medea’s body as a physical symptom indicative of an internal 
problem. This chapter also explores contemporary means by which people tried to 
understand causes from their effects, such as physiognomy and pulse theory and looks 
at Apollonios’ incorporation of these methods to provide his own diagnosis for 
Medea’s pathos. Apollonios follows medical and philosophical thought in attributing 
Medea’s bodily and mental diseases as arising from internal imbalance such as excess 
of internal fire. This internal fire creates Medea’s most prevalent physiological 
symptom; fever, which manifests externally as, for example, a blush on the cheeks. In 
response to the importance placed on symptoms and physical expressions as illustrative 
of some internal characteristics, Apollonios also places a focus on Medea’s facial 
expressions, and in particular her eyes. In doing this he demonstrates an interest in 
Hellenistic aesthetics and also in the quasi-medical field of physiognomy which aimed 
at understanding internal characteristics from external ones in order to foretell a 
person’s disposition. This chapter also discusses how physiologically, the distress and 
pain that the pathos causes is able to manifest itself as perceivable bodily pain. 
Apollonios, in order to make Medea’s emotional suffering manifest as real somatic pain 
draws on contemporary discussions of the nervous system and philosophic debates on 
the hēgemonikon (governing part of the psyche) and its relationship with the body as 
the locus of emotions and sense-perception.  
Apollonios uses symptomology as a means to physically show manifest 
Medea’s internal physical and psychological turmoil. Apollonios both shows the 
physical symptoms of Medea’s disease, the ‘seen’ and also affords his audience a 
glimpse into the internal unseen, the ‘felt’. He uses his position as omniscient narrator 
to reveal the internal cause for the external symptom or expression. In doing this he 
blends the poeticism and emotion of his poetry with the impersonality and 
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informativity of diagnosis. Just as the internal is the causation of the external, 
Apollonios often retards the most prolific symptoms until the end of the narrative 
passage, showing the ultimate manifestation of the illness, the symptom that identifies 
the sickness to the other characters and the evidence that indicates an internal problem 
has seized the victim’s mind and body. The external symptom is often stressed at the 
commencement of the description, which is resonant with the importance that the 
ancients placed on symptomology in identifying cause from effect, not effect from 
cause.  
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CHAPTER I: PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
 This chapter focuses on the psychology of Medea and in particular, how her 
psychological anguish is modelled on contemporary philosophic models. The 
Hellenistic Period exhibited an increase in an interest in psychology which can be seen 
in philosophy and medicine and even art and literature. Apollonios investigates 
Medea’s psyche and describes how it is affected by her pathos and realistically portrays 
and admonishes against the destructiveness of desire as it manifests in Medea’s body as 
crippling indecision. 
Medea’s emotionally charged manic behaviour, when she is at one moment 
restless and sporadic and the next lethargic and moody, at one moment loyal and pious 
and at another moment treacherous and shameless is most definitely not considered 
normal behaviour to the Greeks. It was this kind of behaviour, especially when 
exhibited by females that was considered incredibly harmful to families and society. 
This is the type of Medea that Euripides manufactures, one that is so impulsive, so 
impassioned and so reckless and vengeful that she has the gall to manipulate men, plot 
against and kill royalty, and murder her own sons. Apollonios draws from this version 
to depict Medea in a different stage of her life, making a similar life-altering decision: 
whether or not to go with Jason and betray her family or stay at home and watch him 
die. The audience comes to this romance with the knowledge in their minds that the end 
result is worse than unsuccessful.
41
 We know that Medea and Jason break up, we know 
she kills the children, and some may know that she will marry Aegeus after all of this. 
But, we must not forget that in Apollonios’ narrative, none of this has happened yet and 
Medea is, for all Apollonios lets us know, an innocent young virgin. We are told that 
she is good with pharmaka but we do not yet know the extent of the sinister power she 
yields.
42
 The powerful pathos that comes over her is so strong and she is too young and 
weak willed to overpower, and it is this that makes the audience sympathize with 
Medea.
43
 Apollonios makes the audience understand and sympathize with Medea by 
delving into the workings of her psyche and explaining her pleasure and pain, and 
explaining why she cannot act rationally. In constructing this along contemporary 
philosophical and medical models Apollonios brings to this depiction an unprecedented 
realism to Medea’s suffering.  
                                                   
41 cf. Broeniman (1989). 
42 Some of the drugs that Medea has are helpful, and some destructive (3.802-4). 
43 Papadopoulou (1997) 653. 
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Firstly, in response to contemporary philosophic belief, Medea’s psyche is 
unified, and her hēgemonikon (ruling faculty) receives, interprets and decides on 
information and is also the locus of emotions. Disruptions in pneumatic tension of the 
psyche disrupt its ability to perform functions properly. Pneumatic tension is the system 
of pneuma ‘breath/ air’ that flows through the entire body and is the mechanism behind 
physical and psychic functioning, as I will discuss shortly. When this pneumatic 
tension is disrupted it causes weak-will, and weak-will makes a person who may 
already be naturally susceptible to the pathos even weaker in their resolve. It makes 
them ignore right reason and they instead decide on the very thing they know will cause 
the most destruction. However, Apollonios acknowledges that in Medea this decision is 
the result of a long internal struggle which is made harder by the degree to which she 
clings to each value. This indecision that arises with the inception of pathē was 
depicted by Euripides in his Medea and was also a topic of interest for Chrusippos (c. 
280-207 BC). For it seems that the very aspects of Euripides’ treatment of Medea; her 
lack of psychological control, her decision-making process, her unique self-
consciousness and the articulateness of her sub-consciousness, in response to her 
pathos, that attracted Chrusippos, are, in response, the very same aspects of Medea’s 
experience that Apollonios accentuates, develops and draws attention to. This chapter 
focuses in particular on how erōs as a pathos affects Medea’s psyche, and how these 
effects manifest as emotional, irrational behaviour.   
This chapter looks at how Apollonios redefines the very nature and construction 
of Medea’s psyche according to philosophic models. He recreates Medea’s psyche 
along Stoic lines in particular, to demonstrate the disease-like destruction that desire as 
a pathos effects upon a psyche, in accordance with the Stoics’ general admonition of 
the pathē.44 He also recreates Medea along Stoic lines to demonstrate one model of 
how a pathos seems to take over a body with respect to its ability to make decisions 
that are in accordance with ‘right reason’.45 He was, therefore also writing a didactic 
poem of sorts, which his predecessor Chrusippos, and the other early Stoics would have 
                                                   
44 For a discussion of the presence of Stoicism in Alexandria see Fisch (1937).  
45 The Stoics deem actions that are in accordance with right reason to be morally acceptable. This is 
deemed ‘right reason’ as opposed to just ‘reason’ because the impulse and judgement are themselves 
rational. ‘An impulse ‘disobedient to reason’ cannot be blocking the reasoning that leads to action; it is 
the reasoning that leads to action. It must then, be disobedient to reason in a normative sense – “right 
reason” the reasoning that should have been followed.’ Annas (1992) 105. Diogenes Laertius gives 
examples of acts that are in accordance to right reason that include honouring parents, brothers and 
native  land (Lives 7.107-8); Long (1974) 190. Gill says these actions are not rational because they are 
not what a wise-man would do (1996) 228. 
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lauded. For, the Stoics were undoubtedly the philosophical school (especially in the 
Hellenistic Period) with the most interest in poetry, and uniquely, they praised the 
power of poetry as a useful and morally good tool for society. In this they deviated 
from other thinkers like Plato and the Epicureans. The Stoics believed in particular in 
the power that poetry has in its capacity to represent something in nature truthfully.
46
 
They therefore used poetry, Homer especially, along with arguments of common usage 
to prove some of their more controversial points. They even used poetry to prove 
psychopathological arguments in their dialogue with physicians. Moreover, they were 
interested in psychology and the way that the psyche was affected by pathē in its ability 
to make decisions. They provided a model construction of the mind and discussed why 
and how we make decisions when affected by emotions and the effect of those 
decisions. Apollonios constructs his Medea in accordance with Chrusippos’ model of 
the sympathetic relationship between body and psyche and how pathē affect this.  
Apollonios in particular seems to have been influenced by the Stoics, and 
discusses his Medea within the confines of their discussion of pathē and their effects on 
the psyche. The Argonautika is the first substantial treatment of both the physical and 
mental effects that love and other pathē have on their victims. The depiction of these 
effects of desire, in particular, in the Argonautika is intense, destructive and out-of-
control. As a result, desire, in the Argonautika brings only brief happiness, but leaves 
lasting destruction in the form of severed familial ties and compromised values. He 
describes the bitter aspect of the pikros-glukos relationship that pathē create as not only 
momentary bouts of physical pain but also lasting emotional pain into the future which 
come as a result of a series of bad decisions made by impassioned minds. If Apollonios 
was looking for a contemporary model for his own description of emotions, then the 
largest, and most appropriate model available to him, was the Stoic one.
47
 This is 
because for the Stoics the worst affliction was a pathos (passion). Pathē are commonly 
translated as ‘emotions’, and constitute a range of emotions  including desire, fear, 
pain, pleasure, dejection, joy and so on. Pathē were considered, to the Stoics, inherently 
bad because they lead us away from virtue
48
 and this is why the ideal state for the 
                                                   
46 Kyriakou (1997) 271. 
47 In normal Greek usage pathē are neither inherently good nor bad, this is determined by how they are 
handled. However, the Stoics thought that pathē were inherently bad; Annas (1992) 103. 
48 They cause us to become attached to values we deem to be desirable and cause us not to give moral 
value the supremacy it demands; Annas (1992) 115. 
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Stoic-wise man was to be apathēs (without pathē).49 The Stoics, although pessimistic 
towards the effect of passions in our lives, were nonetheless the sect who most 
extensively discussed them, and the psychology and physiology they affect. This 
chapter discusses how Apollonios in particular adapts the Stoic concept of a pathos to 
his erōs to show realistically the destructiveness of erōs by making it manifest itself in 
Medea as realistic mental illness, and poor moral choices.  
The philosophers were able to realistically discuss the effect that desire has on 
the mind in physiological terms because they had begun to be considered akin to 
physicians. The concept of ‘philosopher as physician’ is marked by the dominance that 
the thought of philosophers such as Empedocles, Pythagoras and Alcmaeon began to 
have in the discussion about psychic and medical issues. This trend continued into the 
Hellenistic Period as Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans for example had more 
sway over the population than physicians such as Herophilus and Erasistratos.
50
 This 
was in part because philosophers had already established themselves as vital and 
reliable sources of medical insight. They also legitimized their discipline along medical 
lines by likening ailments of the psyche to ailments of the body. The soul was now 
considered to be corporeal (at least by the two largest philosophical schools of the time, 
the Epicureans and the Stoics) and became discussed as such.
51
 Mental diseases were 
considered directly analogous with somatic diseases and both could and had to be cured 
and the treatment of the former was the philosopher’s job. Antiphon (5th century BC) 
for example, ‘founded an art to cure griefs, analogous to that which among doctors 
serves as a basis for the treatment of disease’ (Plutarch, Lives 10.833c2). They entered 
the realm of treatment when they aimed at healing these psychic ailments. However, 
they did this not through therapeutics or dietetics or unguents, but through philosophy 
and ethics. Democritus says ‘medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the 
psyche from passions (pathē)’ (fr. 31). In his later writings, Plato discusses mental 
defectiveness as a sickness in the psyche
52
 which usually exhibits itself as erratic or 
impassioned behaviour which must be cured. Theoretically, once the treatment of 
knowledge had been exercised, proof that the therapy had worked was when the 
                                                   
49 To the Stoics, the state of apatheia was defined as the state of not acting in accordance with any pathē, 
not as the state of not having any pathē present, as these are inevitable and attack even the wise-man.  
50 Lloyd (2003) 211. 
51 The concept of the corporeality of the psyche is further discussed in Chapter Two. 
52 Gill (1985) 321. 
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rational faculty had taken back full control of the person.
53
 The philosophers treated the 
psychological manifestations of the pathos as doctors would treat illness they wanted to 
treat therapeutically, but to do so they had to explain how the pathos was interacting 
with the psyche.   
In addition to the negative effects that emotions have on behaviours, the 
philosophers also wanted to investigate the processes that our ‘minds’ go through when 
receiving, interpreting and acting on information that we use in order to make 
decisions. In the Hellenistic Period the philosophical aim was to understand the soul, 
which in this period had all of its faculties in one location; reasoned, spirited and 
desiderative existed in the heart and chest area and it is this model which is the basis for 
the origin of our modern understanding of ‘mind’.54  Long says ‘The Stoic’s conception 
of the mind or ‘governing part’ of the unified soul (hēgemonikon) centralizes and co-
ordinates psychic life to an extent that is without parallel in the rest of Greek 
philosophy. This ‘mind’ constitutes not only the perceiving, feeling, thinking and 
wanting of human beings but all that they do, as intentional agents’.55 The theory of a 
unified psyche remained the dominant idea from this point on, and we can trace the 
synonymy of soul and mind in the very evolution of the word ‘psyche’ which became 
the root for such mental words as psychology, psychiatry, psychotic and psychedelic. 
Apollonios uses the traditional poetic terms thumos (heart/spirit), psukhē (psyche), 
kardia (heart), and phrenes (mind) as virtually indistinguishable elements of the 
psyche.
 56
 In fact I posit that the variations in these terms come mainly from 
considerations of meter, not because of any variation in meaning. They all reside in the 
                                                   
53 Even though they acknowledged that to be in the constant state of this was incredibly difficult to 
achieve, and was the state of the wise-man; Lloyd (2003) 211. 
54  Both the Stoics and Epicureans, the largest and most influential philosophical schools in the 
Hellenistic Period argued that the psyche was unified, as did Aristotle’s pupils, the Peripatetics. The 
theory of a partite soul was still held by neo-Platonists even in the 2nd century AD, the most famous 
example being Galen.  
55 Long (2008) 572. 
56 In both Archaic poetry and Euripides, thumos can be virtually equated with erōs or anger, but also, it is 
a general term used to describe a force (e.g. courage) that directs the self to action; Foley (1989) 69-70. 
For a further discussion of the meaning of thumos in Greek literature see Padel (1992) 27-30. In the 
Argonautika, thumos usually acts passively, not assertively and aggressively like in Euripides’ Medea. 
When the forces compelling Medea are described they are shame, fear and desire; not thumos. Thumos 
acts less like an emotion (anger) and more like psyche itself.  The thumos does not represent the 
aggressive pathos itself; rather, it is actually depicted as being affected by the aggressive pathos: ‘as 
many things as the Erotes stir up in her thumos to care about’ (πολλὰ δὲ θυμῷ / ὥρμαιν' ὅσσα τ' ἔρωτες 
ἐποτρύνουσι μέλεσθαι 3.451-2). Apollonios’ usage of thumos is comparable to its use in Stoic doctrine, 
for they also place thumos in the chest, and like the heart, it is connected with cognition, the will and 
emotions. To the Stoics, thumos is synonymous with psyche ‘drinking the life-destroying drugs’ 
(πασσαμένη ῥαιστήρια φάρμακα θυμοῦ  3.785-790, 724).  
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chest, can be affected by winds and liquids,
57
 are affected by emotions, act like a mind 
responding to external stimuli, and all represent Medea’s ‘rationality’ ‘or prudence’ as 
well as her combating desires. There is no element in the body that Medea has that is 
not linked back to her heart and in fact some Stoics actually thought the hēgemonikon 
was in the pneuma around the heart.
58
 One of these interests in the hēgemonikon was an 
interest in the physiology (the physical way that it functions) of the hēgemonikon and 
the mechanism behind the hēgemonikon functioning was pneuma. Pneuma literally 
‘breath’ was a concept that by the Hellenistic Period was in every philosopher and 
physician’s theories to explain psychic and bodily processes. 59 These processes can 
find their parallel with Apollonios’ pneumatic terminology. 
The way that these psychic faculties are shown manifest by Apollonios is 
through his physicalization of the psyche. To the Stoics, the psyche was pneuma,
60
 and 
if we accept that Medea is constructed along a Stoic model, then it can be recognized 
that the movements and affections of her psyche are exhibited as pneuma as well. Pathē 
affect the psyche by disrupting its very nature, its pneumatic tension (the steady tension 
[tonos] of pneuma that flows throughout the body) which constitutes its ability to act 
rationally.
61
 Pneuma is responsible for many psychic functions, including perception 
and sensation. Sense-perception (aesthesis), for example, is said to be the pneuma 
extending from the hēgemonikon to the limbs, the apprehension of the perception 
through them, and also the make-up of the sense organs themselves.
62
 Annas explains 
this as ‘the hēgemonikon centralizes the senses and other functions, like an octopus 
whose tentacles are extensions of pneuma to the senses, or a spider sitting in the middle 
of its web, sensitive to every change (Calcid, In Tim 220). What happens in the sense 
                                                   
57 For a discussion and examples of emotions depicted metaphorically as winds in Greek literature see 
Padel (1992) 88-98. 
58 Mansfeld (1989) 319. 
59 For an in depth analysis see Lloyd (2007).  
60 Pneuma is the very make-up of a person. Pneuma is responsible for the form of the body (muscles and 
sinews) and for psychological attributes. These rely on an appropriate tonos of pneuma; Long (1996) 
233. The kind of life depends on the degree of this tension (SVF ii 714-16); Long (1974) 171. The free 
flow of pneuma within the body is also crucial because any impediment in it results in disease; Boylan 
(2007) 211. 
61 Fire and air are the ‘active’ elements which work together upon the two ‘passive’ elements, earth and 
water. But these are also opposed to each other as hot element to cold element and outward moving force 
to inward moving force. The combination of the two is the tonos, produced by the opposed forces; 
Graver (2007) 19. The fire aspect of fire-pneuma as working in Medea through the fire similes of erōs , 
the conflagration of which manifest as fever will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
62 Annas (1992) 71. 
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organ is transmitted to the hēgemonikon and recorded there.’63 The hēgemonikon is the 
locus for sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, and also voice and reproduction
64
 and all of 
these are mechanized by pneuma. To the Stoics, the very psyche is pneuma
65
 and as a 
pathos is an upset (ptoia) in the psyche’s pneumatic tension, it disrupts the mind’s 
ability to function.
66
 Because of the corporeality of the psyche during this period, the 
idea of tonos was conceived along somatic lines: just as the body has good or bad 
tension, so too does the soul have good or bad pneumatic tension. In the body, tension 
takes the form of fitness and taut muscles, enabling the body to perform what is needed. 
In the soul, it takes the form of firmness of character; like an under-exercised body 
unable to perform physical tasks which it should be capable of, the soul with the poor 
tension (atonos) will respond weakly when it should be responding firmly.
67
 This 
‘responding’ refers to the strength with which the person tries to act in disobedience of 
their pathos and follow right reason. The state of one’s overall pneumatic tension 
affects not only what one perceives but how one reacts and makes decisions.
68
 
Chrusippos used the example of Menelaus, when confronting Helen at Troy, 
determined to kill her but then feebly giving in because he felt overcome by her beauty, 
as an example of weak pneumatic tension (Galen, De Placitis IV 6.1-11).
69
 The result 
of seeing Helen was his assenting to the impulse to embrace her, which made him fail 
to act as he had resolved as right. Emotional behaviour is thus considered, on the 
                                                   
63 Annas (1992) 62. 
64 Annas (1992) 61. 
65 For a very good discussion on this see Webb (1982) 29. 
66 Annas (1992) 45, cf. Galen, De Placitis 3.1.9-15. 
67 Annas (1992) 106. 
68 An affected pneumatic tension also affects the psyche’s very ability to interpret the impression; Annas 
(1992) 83. An impression appears externally and makes an imprint in the hēgemonikon that represents an 
impulse to do something and is conceived physiologically as a sort of motion of the mind (pneuma) that 
arises in response to a modification of the mind from an external impression (cf. 3.638). Brennan invites 
us to define not only belief and knowledge, but desire, fear and all of the other emotions as impressions; 
Brennan (2005) 61. Medea’s inception of desire is external and also targets the heart (3.275-87), where 
impressions are located (Sext. Emp., Against the Professors 7.231; Diog. Laert., Lives 7.159; Aetius, 
4.5.6; Galen, De Foetuum 4.698). Cleanthes envisioned how an impression worked as akin to a wax seal, 
leaving an imprint in the mind, which Brennan invites us to imagine as a mental picture, of for example 
someone’s face; Brennan (2005) 53. cf. 3.455-8 where every aspect of Jason’s physique are imprinted in 
Medea’s mind and dance before her eyes, enticing her; cf. Chariton, Callirhoe. 2.4.3, 6.7.1 dissc. in Will 
(1962). An impression can be deceptive and cause the assent to it to be a false belief, this was why the 
Stoics warned of them. Epictetus addressing Euripides’ Medea says, ‘Do not be carried away by the 
intensity of an impression; but say, ‘wait a moment for me, impression; let me see who you are and what 
you are about and let me test you... do not let it lead you on by depicting the consequences. Otherwise it 
will take possession of you and take you wherever it wants to. What you should do rather is oppose it to 
a fair and noble impression and discard this sordid one’ (Diss 11.13.24-6; cf. Diog. Laert., Lives 7.46-
47). 
69 All translations of On The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato are from De Lacy (ed., trans. & comm.) 
(2005) Galen: On The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato Volumes I-III. 
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whole, as a result of a structural weakness in the psyche.
70
 The state of the psyche 
allowing the passion to have its way (not the possession of the pathos itself) is a 
weakness; the person is mentally flabby and should shape up by improving their 
reason.
71
 Reason was considered the pneuma that is extended through the body at a 
higher level of tension than the other soul-pneuma.
72
 Apollonios is able to show the 
invisible disruption of the reason- pneuma in Medea’s mind by in response, 
physicalizing its motions as winds.  
By the time that we find Apollonios writing in, pneuma was the standard 
explanation for the vital and psychic functioning of the body from almost every 
influential philosophical school.
73
 The idea of pneuma as a facilitating element in the 
body would have been so ingrained in an ancient audience that I think it would be 
almost impossible, especially for the learned audience, not to associate the ‘winds’ and 
‘breezes’ that buffet or occur within Medea as pneuma in some form. ‘Her mind 
fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness’ (καί οἱ ἄηντο στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ 
καμάτωι φρένες 3.228-89).  Hunter identifies this as the moment when erōs takes away 
Medea’s judgement.74 When we view the mentions of the thumos, the phrenes, and the 
heart and so on, when buffeted with wind, or when they soar, or flutter or whirl, as 
moving in response to being affected by disturbances and imbalances in the pneumatic 
tension:
75
 ‘her heart fluttered within her with joy’ (τῆς δ' ἔντοσθεν ἀνέπτατο χάρματι 
θυμός 3.724).76 This word that the Stoics use to describe the upset that the pathos 
makes (ptoia) literally means a terror or fright, or when metaphorically used means a 
flutter like a disruption of air. This is the same cognate with the verb ptoeo ‘to fly, 
flutter’ which is what the thumos, phrenes, nous and psyche do. After Medea’s meeting 
with Jason, ‘her mind soared high in the clouds’ (ψυχὴ γὰρ νεφέεσσι μεταχρονίη 
                                                   
70 Graver (2007) 71. Pneuma is both nothing more than a mixture of air and fire, but it also possesses a 
remarkable abilities to endow the person with sense-perception and voluntary motion; Graver, 19. 
71 Annas (1992) 106. 
72 Annas (1992) 67-8. 
73 Frixione (2012) 506. The Stoics differentiated between vital pneuma (the pneuma responsible for 
doing base bodily functions, like digestion and circulation) from psychic pneuma which was the pneuma 
which was endowed with some ability to partake in the psychological processes of the body. Chrusippos 
thought that the left ventricle of the heart contained psychic pneuma because it was the location of the 
hēgemonikon whereas Erasistratos thought vital pneuma was in the heart and psychic pneuma was in the 
brain’s ventricles which was then transmitted to the nerves; Cambiano (1999) 601. 
74 The word order of καμάτωι (love-sickness) between noun and adjective makes this clear, cf. 4.1018; 
Hes, Theog 122; Il 14.217, 294; h. Aphr 38; Hunter (1989) 130. 
75 cf. 3.688, 3.610-15, 3.1009, 3.1131. 
76 Tielemen (1996) 241. 
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πεπότητο 3.1150).77 Thus Apollonios exhibits to the audience the affections of Medea’s 
mind, as it is buffeted and blown, as it flutters and flies, as metaphorical descriptions of 
the ‘upsets’ which Medea’s pathos inflicts. These breezes disrupt Medea’s inner 
balance and thus hinder her capacity to reason. A strong pneumatic tension indicates a 
healthy soul, just as physical health in the body is signified by bodily strength and 
tension. Through the buffeting and fluttering of the psychic organs Medea’s struggle 
with weak will and reason, and the onslaught of the passions are exhibited to the 
audience. As a result of the fact that the psyche was now thought to be corporeal, the 
mechanisms behind its functioning were discussed in more physical ways and 
mechanical systems likes the one that pneuma operates in were applied to the system 
which the hēgemonikon used to govern the body. It was this system’s integrity that 
constituted an agent’s ability to make decisions, and if this system was disturbed the 
agent made bad moral decisions, and these bad moral decisions were disparaged by the 
philosophers.   
In the Hellenistic period a large focus of philosophical discourse was on ethics. 
In ancient philosophy, ethics referred to a kind of didactic philosophy which aimed at 
instructing and guiding people how best to live every part of their own life.  According 
to the Stoics’ teachings, the ideal state was one of apatheia, however, because this goal 
was only attainable for the wise man, in response they asked how we should cope with 
these emotions when they do inevitably come upon us in order to better be prepared for 
next time. This is because to the Stoics pathē are inevitable; they are as inevitable as 
fate. Pathos is literally an affliction, and its very nature is intrusive and disturbing. 
Pathē are of course very difficult to repulse, but some people have natural advantages 
and some, have some serious natural disadvantages. Fools, barbarians and lovers, for 
example are more likely to act in accordance with the wrong thing to do because they 
are weak-willed (De Placitis III 6-7, III 18-19). Being weak-willed meant that you had 
a tendency towards acting against ‘right reason’, and what causes this tendency is the 
result of the pathos affecting the very pneumatic tension of the soul.
78
 Medea is a 
barbarian, and a lover, so to start with she is less well-equipped than others (to begin 
                                                   
77 For a discussion of how the mind ‘flies’ in Greek literature in response to emotions including anger, 
fear and desire see Padel (1992) 97. 
78 It was also characteristic of the fool to change his mind a lot and this was because of his unsatisfactory 
make-up (cf. Sext. Emp., Adv. Math 7.434); Arthur (1983) 76. 
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with) in handling her pathē.79 In addition to this, Medea is inexperienced at this point in 
the experiences of love. Posidonius says that ‘those who are unused (to a thing) are 
more greatly affected in situations of fear, distress, desire and pleasure; and the more 
vicious (kakoteroi) are quickly seized by their affections’ (De Placitis IV 5.34). Reason 
is a power that we can improve by experience, and the only way we are able to improve 
our other powers is by improving our reason first.
80
  The strength of Medea’s pathos 
and its influence over her psyche and the strength with which she holds to her values 
makes her decision-making process very difficult and it is this indecision which results 
that Apollonios exhibits in a way that makes the audience sympathize with her 
experience.  
Apollonios depicts his Medea as a person going through having to make a very 
tough moral decision and ultimately as a person so affected by love that she makes the 
wrong decision. Medea’s very moral fibre is compromised by erōs and it is through 
references to medical and philosophical ideas that Apollonios conveys how it came 
about that her psyche was so affected that she betrayed her family and homeland. 
Apollonios was inspired by one particular aspect of Medea’s earlier exposition, 
her moment of indecision. This focus on the inner hidden mechanisms of the mind and 
in particular on psychological examinations of famous characters was sparked by 
innovative works such as Euripides’ Medea. One particular scene of psychological 
indecision in this tragedy influenced not only Apollonios, but also philosophers like 
Chrusippos and Plato and artists like Timomachos. No doubt the Stoics’ interest in the 
psychology of poetic characters was in part caused by the intense psychological 
treatment of characters like Euripides’ Medea. In his Medea she is shown in the midst 
of deciding whether to exact the most punitive revenge possible against Jason by 
destroying his children, or to let her children live and save herself the same personal 
loss.
81
  Chrusippos, in his investigation of the psychological effects of pathē, paid much 
                                                   
79She is a barbarian, a woman, and inexperienced in youth. Aristotle describes akratēs affected by weak-
will as young, trusting and naive (Aristotle, NE 7.14, 1154b10, cf. N.E 1147a7); Charles (2011) 190. 
Galen attributes Euripides’ Medea’s weak-will to a consequence of being ‘uneducated and uncivilized’ 
(De Placitis III 7.13-14) and also says that in barbarians, anger is stronger than reason (De Placitis 
III.1.5). 
80 Annas (1992) 66-7. 
81 Pindar’s treatment of this decision for young Medea lacks any opposing force to subdue Medea’s 
pursuits as she does not have a father who would punish her if she crossed him. Apollonios however, 
includes the presence of Medea’s father Aietes, and emphasises his wrathfulness to make Medea’s 
decision much harder, as if she helps Jason, both she and Jason will be punished. Apollonios includes 
Medea’s fear of her father’s wrath as one of the main driving emotions in Medea’s decision making, and 
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attention to Euripides’ Medea and discussed her psychological make-up along the lines 
of his own theories on psychopathology. It is this model which Apollonios adapts to 
portray his own Medea in her moment of indecision.  Euripides’ Medea’s deliberation 
scene was so famous for its glimpse into a moment of psychological indecision that it 
also became a popular scene in the art world. The composition of Timomachos’ Medea 
showed ‘a pause, a moment of radical suspense, sword in hand, [as] Medea watched her 
children and struggled with her intention to slaughter them in revenge for Jason’s 
betrayal’.82 The idea that this singular moment of internal psychological indecision 
could be captured in a snap shot attests to the Hellenistic aesthetic desire for realism.  
Ancient viewers also noticed and admired the psychological tension in this painting and 
discussed it throughout antiquity.
83
 This painting was so highly regarded that Caesar 
himself bought the painting (along with one of Ajax) for 80,000 talents (Pliny, NH 
7.126). Unfortunately, the original was destroyed in a fire in 80AD but two surviving 
paintings from Herculaneum and Pompeii which are believed to have been inspired by 
Timomachos’ Medea can be used for insight into what the Hellenistic idea of 
psychological indecision looked like when manifest as a facial expression. It was 
arguably this kind of realism to which Apollonios aspired in his writing.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
it is this element of danger that adds drama, suspense and gravity to Medea’s decision (cf. Pindar, Pyth 4; 
Euripides, Medea 434); Papadopoulou (1997) 658. 
82 Gurd (2007) 309. 
83 cf. APl 135, 136, 138, 139, 140; Ovid, Tristia 2.526; Plutarch, Moralia 18a; Pliny, NH 35.145. 
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Figure 1: Fragmentary fresco of Medea from Herculaneum: Museo Archeologico 
Nazionale, Naples. Gurd (2007) 310.  
 
The tension created in Medea’s indecision scenes is heightened by the 
ambiguity created around her own character and behaviours.
84
 As narrator, Apollonios 
plays with the audience’s perception and expectations of Medea to keep them in 
suspense as to how she will act, and he obscures and highlights some of her tendencies 
at different times to emphasise her multifaceted character and the disastrous effects of 
erōs.85  We alter whether we think she is an inherently good girl turned bad only by 
betrayal, or whether she was always a bad girl.  Medea is traditionally a very dangerous 
woman, a murderess, a manipulator and a powerful sorceress. Undoubtedly her most 
violent and terrifying depiction is actualized by Euripides and she provides a terrifying 
warning of the dangers of uncurbed women. She is the sorceress par excellence; the 
daughter of Aietes son of Helios, niece of the infamous Kirke, a priestess of Hekate, 
and a resident of Colchis to the east of Greece which bore associations with magic and 
                                                   
84 Byre (1996) 4. 
85 Apollonios also recasts the couple as Nausikaa and Odysseus who provide a better model of how the 
courtship process occurs in the civilized world. For parallels and discussions see Clauss (1997).  
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sorcery.
86
 Despite all of these negative aspects of Medea’s character that are surely in 
the audience’s mind, Apollonios makes the audience sympathize with Medea and he 
does this by showing her as a victim of destructive love and by exhibiting her 
emotional suffering.
87
  He heightens the degree that the internal is depicted and the very 
fact that he does internalize Medea shows an interest in her side of the story. It 
humanizes her to see her motivations, her fears, her desires and her moral dilemmas.
88
 
Apollonios twists the image of Medea that an audience may expect to see by focusing, 
in Book 3 at least, almost entirely on her maidenhood and her struggle between 
exercising maidenly shame and giving in to the temptation of Jason. Many scholars 
have criticized the psychological unity of Medea as a character because she so 
drastically changes in the fourth book. In Book 3 Apollonios avoids discussing 
Medea’s sorceress side, she is identified as a priestess of Hekate, and indeed she has the 
ability to use powerful drugs, but she uses her powers to help Jason, not harm anyone. 
The term for ‘drugs’ which Apollonios uses is pharmaka which in isolation is 
ambiguous; it can mean both drugs that heal and drugs that harm. Apollonios keeps her 
sorceress side and her maidenly side almost completely separate until Book 4 when the 
sorceress side of Medea is quickly revealed.  She becomes angry, her eyes blaze with 
fire, she wishes to burn down the Argonauts’ ship and she threatens people (4.15ff). 
Her conversation with the moon also reveals to the audience the true extent of her 
acquaintance with dark magic: she prevents the moon from shining at night so she can 
work (4.57ff), and hunt for poisonous roots and corpses (4.50, 4.385ff). Her power as a 
sorceress is further emphasised through the progression of the book as she is able to 
defeat both the dragon that guards the Golden Fleece and Talos, through using magic. 
While in the past it has been argued that the disjunction between Medea’s two sides – 
maiden and sorceress - makes Medea’s psychological character and her changes of 
mind inconsistent and unbelievable, other scholars tend to argue the exact opposite.
89
  
She is complicated and multifaceted like a real person and real people are not 
consistent.
90
 While Apollonios keeps Medea’s witchcraft and love life separate he 
simultaneously forces the audience to accept the premise that her personality contains 
                                                   
86 Hanson (1965) 55. 
87 Mori (2000) 94. 
88 Papadopoulou (1997) 650. 
89 cf. Wilson (2001); Dyck (1989); Phinney, Jr. (1967); Beye (1982).  
90 Wilson (2001) 227. 
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both ‘integrated halves’91 at the same time, and it is this revelation/concealment of 
these characteristics which keeps the psychological vacillation realistic.
92
 
In Medea’s indecision scenes Apollonios shows the audience the very 
physiological make-up of Medea’s dilemma.  He reveals the nature of her pathē and the 
judgements she is torn between, and provides us with a model of how Medea makes the 
decision, as well as how the pathē impede her from making the ‘right’ decision.  
Although Medea does ultimately make the ‘wrong’ decision, and chooses to help Jason 
and her betray her family, Apollonios uses her process as a teaching tool and reveals 
why and how we can be affected in our capacity to reason correctly when under the 
influence of pathē. While Medea is not the Stoic success story of how to deal with 
pathē,93 her portrayal is real, and the process of how she made the wrong decision is 
validated through discussion. She is often criticized for being impulsive, irrational, and 
too strong-minded with no consideration for the consequences, but I think these 
readings neglect to look at the intense indecision and hesitation that Medea goes 
through and the pain that this causes her. It also fails to acknowledge how the ancients 
would have viewed Medea as being medically compromised by her pathē in her ability 
to make this decision and behave properly as Apollonios alludes to. Instead, it focuses 
on Medea as a two-dimensional character, and fails to recognize her motivations and 
her limitations. It does not acknowledge any of the subtlety in Medea’s psychology, nor 
any reasons for the flaws in her reasoning. Medea’s character is multifaceted and the 
reason why her moments of indecision are so tense is that she is so firmly rooted in 
each value: desire for Jason and fear of reproach for her act of treason. In Medea’s 
decision scene she oscillates between assenting to her desire and helping Jason, and 
assenting to her fear and not helping him. While the duplicity and contention between 
                                                   
91 Dyck (1989) 456. 
92 For a convincing argument in favour of this see Phinney, Jr. (1967) 334; Phinney, Jr. provides a chart 
to visualize the relationship of this reveal/concealment of Medea’s maiden and sorceress elements. He 
concludes that Book 4 inverts the characterization (sorceress element is now dominant) but nevertheless 
the two main elements remain the same, therefore her change of character in Book 4 should not be 
considered inconsistent behaviour, but previously dormant behaviour now expressing itself more 
obviously.  
93 Though time does not permit me much time to discuss this, the mention of Medea in terms of a Stoic 
model asks the question of how Jason also fits into this analysis. I agree with the views Williams (1996), 
Mori (2005) that Jason should be viewed as a regular man, representative of the average man (this is in 
response to the Hellenistic interest in the individual) attempting to develop himself in journey towards 
becoming something analogous to the Stoic sage. Some of the arguments are; the presence of the epithet 
amēchanos declines dramatically as the journey proceeds as Jason, through experiences, improves his 
knowledge to know next time how better to handle the situation, this includes his increasing disinterest in 
the opposite sex. Jason’s apparent callous indifference towards Medea (with one exception at 3.1077-8) 
is representative of his development to becoming closer to the state of apatheia. Also see Jackson (1992). 
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two concepts is clear in this scene, if we read closely we can see that Apollonios 
applies a Chrusippean model of a unified psyche to Medea, not a partite one, to 
emphasise Medea’s agency and to display the way that pathē affect the psyche as 
perceived in the Hellenistic Period, rather than the Classical: 
ἑζομένη δἤπειτα δοάσσατο, φώνησέν τε·  
“Δειλὴ ἐγώ, νῦν ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα γένωμαι;  
πάντηι μοι φρένες εἰσὶν ἀμήχανοι, οὐδέ τις ἀλκὴ  
πήματος, ἀλλ' αὔτως φλέγει ἔμπεδον. ὡς ὄφελόν γε  
Ἀρτέμιδος κραιπνοῖσι πάρος βελέεσσι δαμῆναι,  
πρὶν τόν γ' εἰσιδέειν, πρὶν Ἀχαιίδα γαῖαν ἱκέσθαι  
Χαλκιόπης υἷας· τοὺς μὲν θεὸς ἤ τις Ἐρινύς  
ἄμμι πολυκλαύτους δεῦρ' ἤγαγε κεῖθεν ἀνίας. 
φθείσθω ἀεθλεύων, εἴ οἱ κατὰ νειὸν ὀλέσθαι  
μοῖρα πέλει· πῶς γάρ κεν ἐμοὺς λελάθοιμι τοκῆας  
φάρμακα μησαμένη; ποῖον δ' ἐπὶ μῦθον ἐνίψω;  
τίς δὲ δόλος, τίς μῆτις ἐπίκλοπος ἔσσετ' ἀρωγῆς;  
ἦ μιν ἄνευθ' ἑτάρων προσπτύξομαι οἶον ἰοῦσα;  
δύσμορος· οὐ μὲν ἔολπα καταφθιμένοιό περ ἔμπης  
λωφήσειν ἀχέων· τότε δ' ἂν κακὸν ἄμμι πέλοιτο  
κεῖνος, ὅτε ζωῆς ἀπαμείρεται. ἐρρέτω αἰδώς,  
ἐρρέτω ἀγλαΐη· ὁ δ' ἐμῆι ἰότητι σαωθείς   
ἀσκηθής, ἵνα οἱ θυμῶι φίλον, ἔνθα νέοιτο·  
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτῆμαρ, ὅτ' ἐξανύσειεν ἄεθλον,  
τεθναίην, ἢ λαιμὸν ἀναρτήσασα μελάθρωι  
ἢ καὶ πασσαμένη ῥαιστήρια φάρμακα θυμοῦ.    
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὧς φθιμένηι μοι ἐπιλλίξουσιν ὀπίσσω  
κερτομίας. τηλοῦ δὲ πόλις περὶ πᾶσα βοήσει  
πότμον ἐμόν· καί κέν με διὰ στόματος φορέουσαι  
Κολχίδες ἄλλυδις ἄλλαι ἀεικέα μωμήσονται· 
‘ἥ τις κηδομένη τόσον ἀνέρος ἀλλοδαποῖο  
κάτθανεν, ἥ τις δῶμα καὶ οὓς  ἤισχυνε τοκῆας, 
μαργοσύνηι εἴξασα.’ Τί δ' οὐκ ἐμὸν ἔσσεται αἶσχος; 
ὤ μοι ἐμῆς ἄτης. ἦ τ' ἂν πολὺ  κέρδιονεἴη 
τῆιδ' αὐτῆι ἐν νυκτὶ λιπεῖν βίον ἐν θαλάμοισι,  
πότμωι ἀνωίστωι κάκ' ἐλέγχεα πάντα φυγοῦσαν,  
πρὶν τάδε λωβήεντα καὶ οὐκ ὀνομαστὰ τελέσσαι.” (3.770-801) 
 
And so sitting, full of doubt she said:
94
 
‘Which of these miseries am I to choose? 
                                                   
94 Apollonios experiments with many variations of this word δοάσσατο (innovating Homer’s meanings, 
cf. Il 14.23; Od 24.239) to emphasise the presence of deliberation (3.770, 3.818-19, 3.954-55); Garson 
(1972) 1. 
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My mind is utterly at a loss, nor is there any 
cure for this pain, for it burns ceaselessly, always the same. Would 
it have been better if earlier I were killed by the arrows of Artemis 
before I saw him, before Chalkiope’s sons reached the 
Achaian land. Some god or Fury brought them from there 
to cause me much weeping and anguish. 
Let him die in the contest, if it is his fate to die on  
that plane. How could I devise to help with my drugs  
without my parents noticing! What could I say? 
What trick, what crafty scheme can help them? 
Shall I meet him alone, away from his comrades? 
Oh I am unlucky! Nor do I expect that even his death will 
bring relief from this anguish; that is when he will bring 
me pain, when he no longer lives! Away with shame! 
Away with good reputation! He will be saved by my desire 
and may go off, unscathed, wherever he wants to go. 
But I, on that same day, when the contest has been completed,  
may I find death, either hanging my throat on a beam,  
or by drinking drugs that destroy life.  
But even after I am dead, hereafter they will reproach 
me with their glances. Far off the whole city will shout  
of my fate, and wherever they go, the Colchian women 
will speak of me accuse me of shameful acts; 
‘she who cared so much for some foreign man, 
that she died, she who dishonoured her home and her parents, 
in yielding to her lust.’ Of what disgrace will I not be accused?  
Oh alas for my mad folly! Much better would it be to  
end my life here, on this very night, in this room,  
in an unexpected death, escaping all the bitter reproaches  
before doing these outrageous and unspeakable things.’ 
 
In this passage the impediment to Medea’s happiness is her inability to make a 
decision according to right reason because of the combating emotions she feels. These 
two main emotions are desire and fear: desire for Jason, to save his life and to become 
his wife, and fear of the repercussions she might suffer for betraying her family. The 
genus of Stoic pathē comprises desire (epithumia), fear (phobos), pain (lupē) and 
pleasure (hēdonē), but desire and fear are primary.95 Apollonios focuses in the Medea 
passages on her desire and fear, and the pain and pleasure they bring her. In line with 
Stoic thought, she feels both pain and pleasure as subsequent, or supplementary 
                                                   
95 Annas (1992) 104; for a more comprehensive list see Stob, Ecl 2.90.19-91.9. Cairns states that aidōs is 
also included as a pathos (1993) 411. 
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emotions in response to her desire and fear. In Stoic doctrine, desire is directed toward 
apparent good, and fear is directed at apparent evil.
96
 Pleasure and pain supervene on 
these sometimes: pleasure when we get what we are desiring or escape what we fear, 
and pain when we fail to get what we were desiring, or happen upon what we were 
fearing.
97
 It is this intense pleasure (the glukos) which Medea feels when she gratifies 
her desire for Jason that is a major driving force behind her actions. It is because of this 
indecision and the tug-of-war between acting in accordance with reason and acting in 
accordance with a desire that this monologue recalls Euripides’ Medea so strongly.  
The background before which we must view Apollonios’ treatment of Medea’s 
passion and indecision is Euripides’ Medea. Euripides’ Medea was produced in 431 BC 
and depicted a hateful, powerful sorceress version of Medea as a woman dealing with 
her husband’s rejection by killing their own two children and poisoning his new bride. 
The most powerful scene in that play is where Medea is deliberating whether to kill her 
children or not. This internal debate is animated as a push-and-pull between two 
controlling parts of her partite soul, anger (thumos) and reason (bouleumata). Medea’s 
agency in the decision-making is reduced and she is overpowered and subject to the 
outcome of their battle.
98
 Because of the feeling of being out of control of your own 
actions that such affection caused, this kind of state was a very frightful and dangerous 
concept for the philosophers, and should be cured. These few lines sparked great 
discussion in the philosophical community about akrasia (lack of control): 
καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,  
 θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,  
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς. (Medea 1078-80) 
And although I see the evils which I am about to do,  
My anger (thumos) overpowers my rational plans to save the children,
99
 
just as it is the blame of the greatest evils in me  
Medea acts in a state of akrasia because she is no longer feels in control of her 
own decisions and cannot act in accordance with reason. Instead, her emotion, her 
anger, her desire for revenge governs her and forces her to act in disobedience to right 
reason. Euripides’ Medea was most likely constructed along Platonic lines and in fact 
                                                   
96 Annas (1992) 105. 
97 Stob, Ecl 2.88.8-89.3 
98 The thumos is the agent; Gill (1996) 224. 
99 ‘rational plans to save the children’ is Foley’s translation of these lines; (1989) 67. 
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the concept of akrasia was first discussed by Plato in his Protagoras where Socrates 
talks with Protagoras about the strength of knowledge. Plato says: 
Come, my good Protagoras, uncover some more of your thoughts: how are you 
in regard to knowledge? Do you share the view that most people take of this, or 
have you some other? The opinion generally held of knowledge is something of 
this sort—that it is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not regarded 
as anything of that kind, but people think that, while a man often has knowledge 
in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else—now by passion, now by 
pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about 
knowledge is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by 
any other force. Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that 
knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns 
what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise 
than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succour for 
mankind? (Plato, Protagoras 352b1ff) 
The hypothesis is that ordinarily, if a person exercises his knowledge and 
recognizes the right thing to do, he does it, but when the opposite happens, if a person 
recognizes the right thing to do, and acts contrary to it and in accordance instead with 
some kind of passion, then this can be viewed as akrasia, because how can anyone be 
fit to make decisions if they are not governed by knowledge.  The right thing to do, ‘in 
accordance with reason’ would be not to kill her children and do harm to Jason and 
herself. The fact that Medea here seems to acknowledge that she knows what ‘evils’ 
(kaka) she is about to commit yet decides to commit them anyway, shows that she has 
now become akratic; she is ‘out of control’. Chrusippos said ‘a person not only rejects 
reason in desires, but also makes the supposition that he should ‘cleave’ to the thing 
even if it is not beneficial. (De Placitis IV 5.29-43).
100
 This element of akrasia seems 
very important, as the person shows that they are ‘out of control’ by simultaneously 
knowing they should not do something, but then doing it anyway.
101
 This is because the 
pathos affects their ability to reason and do the right thing. However, Platonic and Stoic 
views regarding exactly how the pathos affects the person’s ability to reason are 
described very differently.  
In Platonic akratic episodes, some internal factor such as anger (thumos) or reason 
(logismos) is said to take over and directs the person to bring about an action that is 
                                                   
100 cf. De Placitis IV 6.27. 
101  Joyce states ‘an agent, Medea, is akratic if and only if she freely, knowingly and intentionally 
performs an action Φ while judging that a similar action Ψ is the better thing to do’ (1995) 335.  
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different to what the person had previously recognized as best to do, yet an action 
which pursues the desire which the person is happy to gratify.
102
 Ethically, the ideal 
state is obviously for every man to be ruled and governed by knowledge and reason. 
However, when a person becomes governed by pathē they make him ignore his 
knowledge and reason. Pathē, however, cause a person to get carried away, and forget 
about their ‘reason’ side. Medea too, ignores reasonable plans and commits to killing 
her children in Euripides, and decides to betray her family in Apollonios, for ‘she no 
longer considered her rational plans (boulē)’ (3.818-19).  These people are referred to 
as akratēs because they seem out of control. The philosophers educated how employing 
reason and knowledge are therapeutic and help cure mental defectiveness. Euripides’ 
Medea, in her lack of following reason indeed seems to have a lack of self-control, in 
fact she is taken over by her internal elements, anger and reason. It is exactly this 
interest in the loss of control over reasoning that attracted the early Stoic philosopher 
Chrusippos to the case of Medea, as he wanted to show why and how she was akratic 
because of her pathos. He however, did not discuss this as a push-and-pull relationship 
like the one Euripides presents. Apollonios responds to this portrayal of pathē and also 
Chrusippos’ criticisms of it in his construction of his Medea’s psychopathological 
experience. 
Chrusippos’ discussion of the psyche and of the effects that pathē have on a 
person are recorded mainly in Galen’s work On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 
and are as a result, tainted by Galen’s anti-Stoic polemic. Galen does, however, also 
engage passionately in the debate about Medea’s akrasia and provides an example of 
applying the theory of a tri-partite psyche to Euripides’ Medea. Galen’s main issue of 
contention with Chrusippos is regarding the nature of the psukhē: more specifically 
whether it is unified or tripartite in nature. Galen does not see Euripides’ Medea’s 
psyche as unified, but rather tri-partite, and as a result, in his reading parts of the 
psyche (anger and reason) have a battle and the winner takes control over Medea’s 
agency and actions:  
She knew what an unholy and terrible thing she was doing when she set out to 
kill her children and therefore she hesitated... then anger dragged her again to 
the children by force, like some disobedient horse that has overpowered the 
charioteer; then reason in turn drew her back and led her away, then anger 
again exerted an opposite pull, and then again reason. Consequently, being 
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repeatedly driven up and down by the two of them, when she has yielded to 
anger, she utters these famous lines. (De Placitis III 3.14) 
Galen sees the movement of the psyche during the decision scene as a violent 
push and pull between reason and anger that occurs between two of the elements within 
Medea. He views it in terms of a partite theory of the psyche; reason, desire and anger 
(thumos) were different parts of the psyche and possessed different faculties, and 
existed in spatially different areas of the body.
103
 As separate entities, they seem to 
battle with one another inside the psyche.
104
 This reading, one of a divided psyche, 
being engaged in a tug-of-war, is the reading taken up by some modern scholars also. 
Snell sees Euripides’ Medea’s monologue as a ‘deliberative contribution to the late 
fifth century debate about the capacity of reason to control emotion.’ 105  He sees 
Medea’s monologue as an attestation to Plato’s theory of the tri-partite soul.  
On the other side of the coin, however, there is another way to interpret these 
lines of Euripides’ Medea’s monologue which is more in line with a Hellenistic 
Chrusippean model of the psyche and it is this model which Apollonios seems to 
follow. Chrusippos does not see Euripides’ Medea’s changes of mind as a result of 
being pushed and pulled by two internal elements that comprise her, but as a result of 
one unified psyche, oscillating between two different decisions. Knox argues that the 
only person who can pose an obstacle to Medea’s plans is Medea herself, and in this 
reading he credits more power to Medea’s agency. She pleads with herself, and changes 
her mind again and again, but her thumos overrules. The agents in conflict are not two 
distinct elements in Medea’s psyche, but Medea herself is somehow involved with both 
sides of the dispute, she is not dragged away by a disobedient horse.
106
 Chrusippos was 
interested in how a pathos can co-exist with, and overcome the awareness that the 
person has that the passion is based on a false judgement.
107
 In response to 
contemporary philosophic thought Apollonios’ Medea’s psyche seems to be unified, 
the heart centralized, and her decision scenes mirror that of a Stoic account of decision 
                                                   
103 Gill (1996) 231-34.  
104 cf. Galen, De Placitis III 7.13-14. Conflicts are able to arise between reason and desire, thumos and 
desire, and while thumos is a natural ally of reason it can also take the side of desire when ‘corrupted’ 
(cf. Plato, Rep 440e4-7, 441a2-3); Kerford (1981) 146. Graver describes the combat as ‘The Platonic 
thumos seems to have the capacity to make judgements, since it has a way to disagree with the decisions 
of the reasoning part. Meanwhile, reason has motivations as well as theoretical understanding, and even 
appetite is able to identify objects and choose a course of action in relation to them’ (2007) 75.  
105 Gill (1983) 137; Snell (1964) 52. 
106 Foley agrees that Euripides’ Medea has more agency than the Galen approach allows; (1989) 64. 
107 Gill (1996) 230. 
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making, not one like that depicted in Euripides where one part supervenes and 
dominates the other.  In Apollonios’ Medea’s monologue, desire and fear are not 
competing with one another, they are not pulling and pushing Medea’s mind to this 
judgement now that. Instead, Medea engages in a stream of conscious narrative, where 
the expression of each emotion and idea articulates itself sequentially. Medea even 
initiates the monologue with a proclamation that she is the one who has to choose what 
to do: ‘Alas, which of these miseries am I to choose? My mind is utterly at a loss’ 
(3.771-2). Medea too exhorts to herself ‘let him woe!’ ‘let him die!’ yet then changes 
her mind to proclaim ‘away with shame!’ ‘away with reputation!’ (3.378ff) yet the last 
thing she says before she ultimately chooses to help Jason is, ‘It would be much better 
to end my life here in my room on this very night in a death without explanation, and in 
doing so escape reproaches, than to do these dreadful, unspeakable things’ (3.789-81). 
The Stoics tried to disprove the Platonic explanation that this indecision was a feeling 
of ‘tug-of-war’. Instead thay argued that these changes of mind are actually a 
successive series of very fast changes of mind in its entirety.
108
 Apparent conflict of 
pathē and reason are according to the Stoics, the unitary mind’s oscillation between pro 
and contra judgements.
109
  This model of oscillation is further explained by Plutarch as, 
‘Emotion is no different from reason nor is there dissension and strife between two 
things, but the turning of one reason in both direction; this escapes our notice because 
of the swiftness and speed of the shift’ (Plutarch, Vir. Mor 446ff). In fact Gill says of 
Chrusippos’ picture of Medea that ‘he likely would have seen Medea as more actively 
involved in either side in turn, and each side acting as a complete self, with ‘reason’ 
and ‘emotions’ of different kinds in play on each side. 110  This concept of unified 
psyche, which alternates between wanting to act in accordance with reason, and then 
passion, aligns with Chrusippos’ analysis of Euripides’ Medea’s monologue.   
In opposition to Galen’s explanation of the horse overcoming the charioteer to 
explain how a person may not act in accordance with reason, Chrusippos uses this 
analogy: 
When a man walks in accordance with a conation, the motion of his legs 
is not excessive but in some way commensurate with the conation, so that he 
may stop when he wishes, or change his pace. But when persons run in 
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109 Long (2008) 581-2. 
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accordance with a conation, this sort of thing no longer happens. The moment 
they set out to do so. I think that something similar to these (movements of the 
legs) happens also in conations because of an excess beyond the rational 
measure, so that when a man exercises the conation he is not obedient to 
reason; and whereas the excess in running is termed contrary to the conation, 
the excess in conations is termed contrary to reason. For the proper measure of 
natural conation is that which is conformable to reason and which goes only so 
far as reason thinks right. Therefore when excess arises in this respect and 
under these conditions, it is said to be an excessive conation and an unnatural 
movement of the soul.  (De Placitis IV 2.14-18) 
In Chrusippos’ model, the process of running originates because of someone’s 
deliberate choice, but once they are running, they are unable to ‘stop on a dime’ as a 
walker would be able to as he has gained his own momentum. This picture suggests 
that a person may be conscious of his pathos (as he is conscious of his legs moving) as 
Medea is, but that this ‘movement’ of the psyche may no longer express his/ her 
deliberate choice. There is an implication of intentionality in saying that someone 
disobeys or rejects reason, and in order for the action of disobedience or rejection to be 
intentional, one has to be conscious of what they are rejecting, i.e. they know what they 
should not do. This is one of the crucial qualifications of akrasia.
111
  
What is the result of this? Why does it matter? Apollonios’ Medea is given 
more control over her own agency and she is made more responsible. In addition, the 
exposition of her process of decision-making also forces the audience to sympathise 
with her, as we watch her go through emotional turmoil which because of the alluring 
temptation of desire forces her to compromise her very moral integrity. While Medea is 
more responsible for her actions in Chrusippos’ model,112 Chrusippos seems to actually 
vilify her less.
113
 In Plato’s theory of the tri-partite soul, the two elements that were not 
‘reason’ were considered irrational. Plato tried to distance himself from these and 
                                                   
111 Aristotle differentiated between two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity and weakness. The latter, having 
deliberated do not stand by what they have deliberated because of a passion, the former are lead by a 
passion because they have not deliberated (N.E 1150b19-22, 1151a1-5, 1152a18-19); Charles (2011) 
189. In addition to this, although they fail to stand by the result of what they had previously deliberated, 
Charles states that there is no reason to believe that their reasoning has been forgotten; (2011) 193. 
112 The Stoics judged that ultimately any deviance from acting in accordance with universal reason 
results from a failure on the agent's part to exercise rationality; Kerford (1981) 156. The individual is 
thus responsible for himself and his feelings; Lloyd (2003) 209. 
113 For a discussion of Medea’s own views on her responsibility see Papadopoulou (1997) 659. 
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considered the spirited and desiderative impulses as bestial and ‘lower’. 114  While 
Euripides’ Medea is controlled by her irrational and bestial impulses, Apollonios’ 
Medea chooses to act in accordance with these impulses because her ability as agent to 
reason has been compromised by her pathē. In Chrusippos’ model, the psyche is 
undivided and as a result, we are indissolubly identified with our emotions and their 
expressions. They are not considered to have come about completely unintentionally. 
The Stoics insist that emotions involve the whole psyche, and are expressed in its 
activities; they are not produced by a subordinate and potentially alien part within us, 
and Annas explains this as follows: ‘Our emotions and feelings, turbulent and 
dysfunctional though they can be, cannot be ascribed to an irrational part over which 
the agent only has indirect control’.115 Medea is not a beast to Chrusippos, she is out of 
control like the runner in his model of akrasia, afflicted by an excessive passion. Her 
state is not one of complete irrationality, where she ceases to function as a human, it is 
of rejection or disobedience to reason whether acting upon the passion is still what she 
wants to do or not, like the running legs, she no longer has control to stop it. There is a 
divide between the individual as he is at the moment and as he might be, if he exercised 
his full potentiality of human reasoning. At any one moment, the person functions as a 
whole, even if his functioning is a sort of malfunctioning.
116
 
And if we were to apply Chrusippos’ running man analogy to Apollonios’ 
Medea we could predict the outcome of the decision-making process. Just as a person 
running is carried away by an impulse and cannot obediently change his pace the 
moment they want to, so too Medea, being carried away by her passion could not 
obediently change her pace the moment she wanted to. She must be with Jason, and to 
be with him she travels down the path she has recognised as wrong and must not go 
down. Her pathos has compromised the control she has over her decision-making, and 
her ability to reason properly has left her and ‘she could not think of anything other 
than Jason’ (3.289-90).117 The thought of Jason controls Medea’s existence and the 
pursuit of his approval and love compromises her own fundamental values. At the end 
of her monologue Medea is resolved to help Jason and even though she is still 
                                                   
114 Annas (1992) 116. 
115 Annas (1992) 115-16. 
116 Gill (1983) 140. 
117 In this moment, Medea is devoid of her good senses, her phrenes have left her. Erōs in literature is 
absent from the psychic organs (nous, phrenes) because of its ability to impair rationality and decision 
making; Calame (1999) 19. 
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ecstatically moving ahead with her plans, she simultaneously recognizes that it is 
wrong to do so (3.1130-3, 3.1159-62). And it is the conviction with which Medea holds 
these values that makes the decision which she must go through all the more painful 
and impassioned. It is also because of the conviction with which she holds these values 
that makes her all the more sympathetic.
118
 
Thus I have shown how Apollonios constructs Medea’s psyche according to 
philosophical constructions to realistically provide a model of how a pathos affects a 
psyche in its ability to make decisions and act in accordance with reason. Apollonios 
thus shows how ultimately erōs manifests as dangerous emotions while simultaneously 
warning the audience of the moral dissonance that erōs creates in society. Apollonios 
follows Chrusippos’ model of how a pathos sways a person to act in accordance with 
that desire and the resistance that the person employs to oppose this. Chrusippos’ 
opinion is hugely important, because it provides an account of how a pathos affects the 
psyche, and its ability to act in accordance with reason was conceived in the Hellenistic 
Period. It pinpoints a moment in time, when some philosophers started to think of the 
psyche as unified, and the interaction between passions and the psyche became not one 
where passion resides inside us, in the thumos, and can rise and battle ‘reason’, another 
element of our psyche, but where the psyche is endowed with reason and oscillates 
between acting in accordance with that reason, and acting in accordance with the 
passion which infiltrates from outside us.
 119
 In following this, Apollonios describes 
Medea’s mind as unified, which provides an updated realistic model of decision 
making where the hēgemonikon oscillates between decisions. This struggle represents 
Medea’s indecision. This is shown in part through erōs’ manifestation as upsets in the 
psyche’s pneumatic tension, the upset of which weakens her mind’s resolve and will 
and heightens the struggle and sympathy of her indecision. Apollonios constructs his 
Medea along contemporary philosophical models to realistically portray her psyche’s 
interaction with pathē. He also provides a model to explain to his learned audience the 
medical and psychological limitations that the manifestation of a pathos puts on a 
person’s very ability to function. 
My next chapter focuses on the physiopathology of Medea; the ways that erōs 
manifests itself physically in Medea’s body. I discuss how erōs causes in Medea 
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119 Reason is not separable from the human psyche and is involved in all its activities; Annas (1992) 67-
8.   
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external symptoms that convey her illness. In this, erōs becomes physicalized and 
treated in accordance with the medical symptoms it produces. In the Argonautika, erōs 
manifests itself as internal heat which inflames to produce symptoms of fever.  Erōs 
exhibits itself as redness on Medea's cheeks, movement in her eyes and as an erratic 
impassioned pulse. Apollonios also manifests erōs as somatic pain, which is the 
ultimate physical manifestation of emotional pain. He does this through constructing 
Medea along medical and philosophical terms and references contemporary 
advancements in anatomy, such as those concerning the nervous system, to heighten 
the realism of her sensations. 
In doing so, Apollonios constructs the manifestation of erōs along medical and 
philosophical lines and as a result he creates a symbiosis of poetic and scientific 
realism.  
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CHAPTER II: PHYSIO-PATHOLOGY 
This chapter looks at the pathology of Medea’s body as it is affected by ‘love-
sickness’. I focus on the ways that the pathos, acting as a sickness, interacts with the 
internal balance of the body to produce physical symptoms of the illness. In this way, 
pathē become medicalized, as they are exhibited as physical sickness, which physicians 
can interpret to find the nature of the pathos. This physicalization of love is possible 
because of the corporeality of the psyche and also because of the interest in finding 
cause from effect. As will be exhibited in this chapter, Medea frequently suffers 
symptoms associated with fever, such as blushing, misty eyes, rapid movements and an 
erratic pulse. The cause of these symptoms should be considered an excess of her 
internal heat, aggravated by the pathos which results in fever. Apollonios merges the 
symbolism of fire being associated with the sensation of love with the medical 
aetiology of her disease as a fever to create realism in her experience of love-sickness. 
This realism is heightened by Apollonios’ description of erōs’ manifestation as 
physical pain. By incorporating contemporary medical discoveries like the nervous 
system Apollonios is able to utilize the new conceptions of sense-perception to 
realistically show the way that destructive emotions manifest themselves as perceivable 
physical pain.  
This chapter looks at how the pathos erōs manifests itself inside Medea and in 
turn how this is expressed on Medea’s outward appearance as a medical symptom. 
Apollonios uses the image of the arrow to transfer erōs from the physical plane into the 
emotional plane to manifest in Medea’s chest as a fire blazing. This fire is 
representative of the concept of ‘internal fire’. The increase of this causes Medea’s 
symptoms which are traditionally associated with fever.
120
 The first example of this 
manifestation in Medea’s outward appearance is the simple appearance of her blush 
which occurs at erōs’ inception: 
αὐτὸς δ' ὑψορόφοιο παλιμπετὲς ἐκ μεγάροιο  
καγχαλόων ἤιξε· βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρηι 
νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίηι φλογὶ εἴκελον. ἀντία δ' αἰεί 
βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καί οἱ ἄηντο 
στηθέων  ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτωι φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην 
μνῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερηι δὲ κατείβετο θυμὸν ἀνίηι· 
ὡς δὲ γυνὴ μαλερῶι περὶ κάρφεα χεύετο δαλῶι 
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χερνῆτις, τῆι περ ταλασήια ἔργα μέμηλεν,  
ὥς κεν ὑπωρόφιον νύκτωρ σέλας ἐντύναιτο,  
ἄγχι μάλ' ἐζομένη· τὸδ'  ἀθέσφατον ἐξὀλίγοιο 
δαλοῦ ἀνεγρόμενον σὺν κάρφεα πάντ' ἀμαθύνει·     
τοῖος ὑπὸ κραδίηι εἰλυμένος αἴθετο λάθρηι 
οὖλος ἔρως· ἁπαλὰς δὲ μετετρωπᾶτο παρειάς 
ἐς χλόον, ἄλλοτ' ἔρευθος, ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο.  (Arg 3. 285-298) 
 
And Erōs, rejoicing with a mocking laugh, darted back out of the high-roofed 
palace. But his arrow burned deep in the girl’s heart  
like a flame. Medea kept casting bright-glances sideways at Jason, 
and her heart fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness. She thought of 
nothing else, and her heart flooded with sweet anguish.  
As when a woman heaps up twigs around a raging brand, 
a poor woman whose livelihood is spinning,  
so that she can have light in her house at night, 
crouches near the fire. A fierce flame conflagrates from a small one,  
and the raging fire consumes all the kindling together. 
Just like this destructive erōs crouched unseen, blazing in  
Medea’s heart. At one moment her cheeks drain pale, at another they 
flush red, the control of her mind now gone.  
 
In this passage the blush is the final external symptom that Apollonios offers to 
the audience and this represents the importance that the study of symptomology had in 
the ancient world, as the symptoms of the body were really the only clue to the 
physician as to the nature of the patient’s illness.121 This is because there were strict 
taboos regarding cutting into dead bodies
122
 and to compensate for the limitations of 
this, the philosophers and physicians developed the field of physiognomy, which 
dictates that from external characteristics we theoretically are able to gain insight into 
both medical and psychological characteristics. The physiognomists also sometimes 
attempt to provide a cause for them and attribute them to internal imbalances, like 
internal heat. Physiognomy is a useful tool when studying the Argonautika because 
Apollonios places an emphasis on the face, eyes, expression and symptoms of his 
characters within the narrative, and these external symptoms that characters display are 
the only clue to the other characters in the Argonautika about their psychological and 
medical states.
123
 These symptoms can be understood when read in addition to the 
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insights that Apollonios gives his audience through glimpses into the unseen, internal 
cause of this external symptom. The most common external symptoms is the change in 
the colour of the cheeks and the frequency of this symptom and its prominence of place 
in important psychopathological scenes warrants investigation as to what exactly this 
means to the physiognomist and how Apollonios manipulates this. 
In the Argonautika the blush implicates anger, desire, loss of innocence, 
bashfulness, abandonment of maidenly shame and foreshadows murder, which is the 
ultimate consequence of Medea’s desire. In the Argonautika red often signifies an 
irreversible change in the person’s character in ways that usually have serious moral 
consequences;
124
 this is because it represents the presence of a pathos which provokes 
erratic behaviour.  
In a time when the understanding of physical symptomology was lacking, the 
change of one’s skin colour was a clear indication to the physician and the other 
characters that something was wrong internally. The question is then, how is Medea’s 
change of cheek colour described in medical and philosophical writings? What are its 
causes and what exactly do the colours mean to a physician who has drawn on years of 
cultural opinions?  For an insight into this we must delve into the field of physiognomy, 
the study of what insight physical characteristics can offer for the study of mental and 
behavioural characteristics. Their investigations include: ‘movements, gestures of the 
body, colour, characteristic facial expression, the growth of the hair, the smoothness of 
the skin, the voice, condition of the flesh, the parts of the body, and the build of the 
body as a whole. (Physiognomica 806a23-806b3) It is these same things that 
Apollonios focuses on to provide insight to the psychology of his characters. 
Physiognomy is a pseudo-science and always bore a close relationship to 
medicine and this is probably the reason that philosophers and physicians saw its use in 
their attempt to understand a man’s condition when it was not transparent. 125  In 
Förster’s catalogue of the loci physiognomici the emergence of physiognomy becomes 
evident, as little to no evidence of it can be found in the works of Homer, Aeschylus 
and Sophocles, and only insignificant traces in Aristophanes, Euripides, Thucydides, 
Herodotus and other Attic orators.
126
 Physiognomics as a field of study seems to have 
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existed in Greece as early as during the time of Pericles. Zopyrus claimed to be 
proficient in physiognomy, and Galen attributed Hippocrates who was also working in 
this time period as the inventor of physiognomy.
127
 Plato also shows a fair amount of 
interest in physiognomy and has a few observations to add, and another of Socrates’ 
pupils, the philosopher Anisthenes wrote a treatise on it (Diog. Laert., Lives 6.16).
128
 
There existed two different types of physiognomists, the seers (metopôskopoi) and the 
physicians. It is not until Aristotle that we see the first systematic treatment of 
physiognomy, and he elaborates on many tenets that appear already accepted in his 
Analytica Priora, De Anima, Historia Animalium, De Partibus Animalium, De 
Generatione Animalium, and most devotedly in the Physiognomica attributed to 
Pseudo-Aristotle. Physiognomy after this time flourished in popularity, and its greatest 
peak in popularity can be seen in the 3
rd
 century BC which is largely due to its 
popularity in Stoic and Peripatetic thought.
129
 Loxus the physiognomist is dated to the 
3
rd
 century BC,
130
 and the Stoics Zeno and Posidonius in particular seem to have 
advanced physiognomics and used it with practical applications. The early Stoics 
included a proficiency in physiognomy as one of the characteristics of a wise-man 
(Diog. Laert., Lives 7.173).
131
 Galen himself in his foray into physiognomics follows 
Stoic sources.
132
 A reflection of this rise in popularity can be seen in the increased 
interest in characterization and personality that litters the literature of the Hellenistic 
Period,
133
 and the importance that the eyes, skin and facial expressions had in depicting 
characterization. The expanse and legitimacy of this profession and medical school of 
thought can be seen in an epigram by Theoctritus (3
rd
 century BC), which attests to the 
professional status of the physiognomist Eusthenes).
134
 The persistence of the 
physiognomy can be seen into the 4
th
 century AD in an anonymous text which also 
discusses the ideas of predecessors like Polemus and Psuedo-Aristotle.
135Apollonios’ 
incorporation of physiognomic references shows his inclusion in the contemporary 
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discussion of characterization, a trend which remained consistent. Seneca was also 
interested in physiognomics, and it proves most evident that Euripides’ Medea’s cheeks 
never change in colour, but both Apollonios’ and Seneca’s Medeas do.136 
The account for the rise in physiognomics in the Hellenistic period, especially 
among the Stoics, is in part due to the contemporary trend of thought that the soul was 
corporeal. This belief entailed that the soul’s affections manifestly became the 
affections of the body, and vice versa.
137
 Pseudo-Aristotle himself hints at this:
138
 
Soul and body, as it seems to me, are affected sympathetically by one and 
other: on the one hand, an alteration of the state of the soul produces an 
alteration in the form of the body, and contrariwise an alteration in bodily form 
produces an alteration in the state of soul. Grief and joy, to take an instance, 
are states of the soul, and everyone knows that grief involves a gloomy and joy 
a cheerful countenance. Now if it were the case that the external expression 
persisted after the soul had got rid of these emotions, we might still say that 
soul and body are in sympathy, but their sympathetic changes would not be 
entirely concomitant. As a matter of fact, however, it is obvious that every 
modification of the one involves a modification of the other. The best instance of 
this is to be found in manic insanity. (Physiognomica 808b11-808b26)
139
 
It is through this corporeality that emotion is able to manifest somatically in the 
form of, for example, a blush. In addition, Aristotle established the main use of 
physiognomics which is its use in determining the cause of the disease from the effect, 
rather than effect from cause. Apollonios uses this same principle in his employment of 
describing physical manifestations of erōs and provides the medical cause of the blush: 
an increase in internal heat.  External symptoms are thus used as indicators of the 
psychological and physiological disturbances that occur unseen and their analysis can 
help determine a diagnosis. 
The skin is obviously an ideal indicator of any internal change because it 
changes colour. The rapid and continual switch between red and white on Medea’s 
                                                   
136 Evans (1969) 62. 
137 The Stoics notion of the corporeality of the soul came about from a denial that anything can exist 
which is not a body or a state of body; Long (1996) 227. Since the soul interacts the body the soul must 
be corporeal. For a detailed discussion on the structure of thought see Hankinson (1998) 239-241. The 
body was thought to be mixed ‘through and through’ (krasis di’ holoon) which Alexander of Aphrodisias 
explains as ‘for none of the soul lacks a share in the body which possesses the soul’ (Alex. Aphr. Mixt 
11.473); Long (1996) 231.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
138 cf. Physiognomica 805a1-805a17. Although Pseudo-Aristotle did not mean that the psyche must be 
corporeal because of this, although the Stoics did.  
139 Translations of Aristotle are taken from Barnes (ed.) (1991) Complete Works (Aristotle).  
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cheeks reveals to the audience the fluctuations of Medea’s physical and psychological 
anguish. The colour for white (khloon) which Apollonios uses has a medical flavour
140
 
and is immediately evocative of Sappho 31 where a similar word is used to convey 
Sappho’s anguish on her skin. Khlôros here indicates a pale, sickly green that comes on 
at love’s frustration: 
ἐκαδε μ’ ἴδρως ψῦχρος κακχέεται τρόμος δὲ  
παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας  
ἔμμι, τεθνάκην δ’ ὀλίγω ‘πιδεύης  
φαίνομ' ἔμ’ αὔται· (Sappho. fr. 31. 13-16) 
 
Sweat runs down, a shiver shakes 
me deep, I feel paler than grass, 
As close to death as that, and green,  
is how I seem. 
Sappho’s pathos here manifests itself physically as the sickly colour on her 
skin. This manifestation is the ‘seen’ but the ‘felt’ i.e., what her psyche is going 
through, remains concealed from those around her. It is because of this concealment of 
the internal that Aristotle developed medical theories behind what was causing the 
manifestation in order to better understand the cause of them. This is the last stanza of 
her poem, and reveals the climax of Sappho’s mental and physical anguish. This climax 
can be seen as the final externalization of her pathos, the ultimate manifestation of her 
desires into the ‘seen’. This is the moment when her internal anguish can be seen by 
those around her and she can no longer conceal her bodily alterations that erōs affects.  
Apollonios too, often follows this model of retarding the external physical symptom 
until the climax of the psychopathological description (3.298) to emphasise the 
climactic effect of the pathos taking over Medea's body. He also is fond of using the 
colour of the cheeks in particular to represent the physical expression of pathē’s 
disruption in the body. 
Firstly, paleness in the Argonautika, more than anything else, seems to signify 
fear. In Book 2 Jason and his comrades have the ‘paleness of fear’ come over their 
cheeks (2.1210) and later, at the thought of impending death on the desert island, in 
fear, the comrades’ ‘hearts grew cold and the colour drained from their cheeks’ 
(4.1280). Apollonios thus associates paleness mainly with fear as well as a reference to 
                                                   
140 Hunter (1989) 131. 
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paleness from a sickness such as the one that Sappho suffers. Pseudo-Aristotle also 
states that paleness is a result of ‘terror and cowardice, as is seen in women.’ 
(Physiognomica 812a12-812a26).  The Stoic Cleanthes explains this in relation to the 
sympathetic connection of mind and body when it comes in particular to the skin:
141
 
When the body is sick or hurt, the soul suffers with it, and conversely the body 
with the soul. For when the soul feels shame the body blushes, and when the 
soul feels fear, the body blanches. Therefore the soul is corporeal. (Nerresius, 
545-548)
142
 
Apollonios thus blends the poetic tradition of associating paleness with frustrated desire 
and the medical tradition that it is a sign of fear. Here, Apollonios is implying that 
Medea is both desirous of Jason, and also fearful of her future decision which her 
desire will force. She knows that her father is violent and vengeful and so choosing 
Jason becomes interwoven with the possibility that she will get caught by her father. 
This alternation between feeling desire and fear is then showed physically on her face. 
Redness of skin signifies bashfulness, irascibility, impudence, desire and is a sign of a 
rogue (panourgos) who is prone to outbursts of passion.
143
 
 First, observe how redness incites and indicates sexual delight and joy: 
‘Medea’s heart within her leapt for joy, her beautiful face grew flushed, and a mist 
descended all over her in the warmth of her delight’ (3.724-6). Redness is first seen 
when Jason appears to the Lemnian women like the star Hesperos, his ‘red (ereuthos) 
brilliance bewitches their eyes through the dark air’ (1.777-8) and closely followed 
after this the ereuthos manifests itself on Hyspipyle’s cheeks.144 The colour represents 
the inception of Hypsipyle’s desire, and foreshadows the similar reaction that Medea 
will have to manic behaviours.  
This redness (ereuthos), in consequence, usually indicates the future 
abandonment of maidenly shame. It thus represents sexual desire and holds 
                                                   
141 Long (1996) 236 uses this quote as an example of Cleanthes’ argument of sympatheia. Aristotle also 
noticed the way that pathē are ‘inseparable from the physical matter of animals’ (Aristotle, De Anima 
1.1403b17) but he does not conclude that because of this the psyche must be body, but the Stoics do.   
142 Evans (1969) 82. 
143  All of these behaviours (perhaps with the exception of bashfulness), are negative, and not the 
personality traits that a virtuous man would aim to have. These find their parallels in physiognomy and 
retain their negative connotations. In fact, according to Pseudo-Aristotle, the wise-man most likely would 
have a pale pink or tawny complexion (Physiognomica 806b4-806b5). 
144 cf. Arg 1.230-33 where the nymph’s cheeks flush red in her lust for Hylas. 
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connotations of the Lemnians’ sexual aggression 145 which does in fact manifest in 
Medea. However, the blush also, as Cleanthes points out, represents bashfulness. It 
simultaneously represents the feeling of desire and the embarrassment of having that 
feeling at the same time. This bashfulness however, is short-lived and ereuthos 
indicates the abandonment of maidenly shame in the pursuit of desire. Apollonios 
describes Hypsipyle as having ‘coy reserve’ (1.785) but she quickly abandons this 
reserve and sense of shame to address Jason. Redness both instigates the desire, and is 
also a physical manifestation of it. The ‘shameless’ Erōs also blushes red. Therefore, it 
is a symbol completely entwined with desire, but also represents the combative 
relationship between desire and shame, and ultimately how desire will, in most people, 
conquer.  
Apollonios uses the blush in a similar way to describe Medea’s conflict between 
desire and her sense of aidōs. When Chalkiope questioned Medea as to what was 
wrong Medea’s cheeks ‘grew red and for a long time maidenly shame held her back’ 
(3.681-2). Ereuthos is employed whenever Medea begins to lose the battle with the 
social value aidōs,146and just as Hypsipyle acted in accordance with desire, rather than 
shame, Medea too will do the same. Instead of speaking the truth to her sister she 
‘speaks with cunning, for the bold Erotes buffeted hard against her’ (3.686-7) in order 
to advance her plans to help Jason. Her blush signifies the familiar sign of bashfulness, 
but also indicates the subsequent abandonment of said bashfulness. Pseudo-Aristotle 
himself describes one of the meanings of redness in this way, ‘a face that reddens easily 
marks a bashful man, for blushing is an expression of bashfulness’ (Physiognomica 
812a27-812b13). After Medea is first struck by Erōs’ arrow and we see her subsequent 
blush, she pulls her veil sideways to stare at Jason (3.445-46). Medea’s veil is an 
important symbol of her modesty, and over the course of the poem its employment, as 
well as that of ereuthos can be used to track Medea’s moral degradation.147 Jason too, 
when he abandons shame, exhibits a similar symptom; ‘At one moment they stared 
coyly at the ground, and at the next they cast glances at each other, and smiling with 
desire, their faces lit up’ (3.1022-4). This is carried further as when Jason comes upon 
the golden fleece in Book 4, and he finally obtains the object of his desire, he again is 
                                                   
145 Pavlock (1990) 30. 
146 Pavlock (1990) 30. 
147 Pavlock (1990) 31. cf. 1.759-762 where Jason’s cloak depicts the giant Tityos attempting to rape Leto 
as pulls aside her veil, which serves as a symbol of the compromise of her maidenly shame; Rose (1985) 
35. 
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depicted with flame-like blush over his cheeks, ‘as when a girl catches in her dress the 
gleam of the full moon hanging high over her bedroom under the roof, and her heart is 
delighted at the sight of the lovely radiance; just so did Jason rejoice as he lifted the 
great fleece in his hands, and over his face and forehead the sparkle of the wool threw a 
blush like flame’ (4.167-73). 148  This moment recalls not only the image of the 
Lemnians, but Medea as well, and thus shows the potential/ inevitable results that such 
powerful lust and desire can produce.
149
 This is ultimately actualized in the shameful 
murder of Absyrtos where red is again employed to signify desire’s effects.  
The poignancy of the symbolism of red in the murder scene is somewhat 
foreshadowed by Apollonios’ fondness for the contrast of red against white. For 
Apollonios is known for being particularly fond of the colour red especially against a 
white background
150
 and this is probably influenced by advances in painting aesthetics 
in Hellenistic painting.
151
 Pliny states, ‘Eventually painting developed different 
characteristics and exhibited light and shade, while contrast of colours (differentia 
colorum) intensified those colours reciprocally’ (Pliny, H.N 35.29). Apollonios 
expresses this most vividly in two particular scenes: the inception of Medea’s desire 
and the murder of Absurtos when Medea’s silver veil is stained red by Absurtos’ blood. 
In this moment the red that represents the ultimate destruction that Medea’s desire has 
caused becomes permanent, ‘And at last hero breathing out his life caught up in both 
hands the dark blood as it welled from the wound, and he dyed red his sister’s silvery 
veil and robe as she shrank away’ (3.471-74).This image recalls the first time we saw 
this colour contrast: when Medea is first stuck by Erōs’ arrow, and her cheeks blush 
between redness and pallor; the inception of Medea’s desire. ‘At one moment her 
cheeks drain pale, at another they flush red, the control of her mind now gone.’ (3.297-
8). Here Apollonios shows the cause of the later effect.  
The veil which was the symbol of Medea’s propriety and maidenly shame is 
now permanently stained with the reminder and pollution of her brother’s murder. This 
second instance of stark contrast of ereuthos on white signifies the consequence of the 
first inception of desire. Her moral degradation is also enhanced by her lack of 
                                                   
148  cf. 4.125-6. Knight discusses the sexual imagery here and how the wedding dress in moonlight 
foreshadows the bad future marriage; (1991) 250; Bremer (1987) 423. 
149 cf. 4.1143. 
150 Phinney Jr. (1967) 146. 
151 Phinney Jr. (1967) 147. 
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deliberation over her brother’s murder. 152  Thus we can see how Apollonios traces 
Medea’s moral degradation through the colour red. What is interesting is that through 
physiognomic references Apollonios employs physiognomy’s main function: predicting 
future behaviours.
153
 Thus, according to physiognomy, Medea’s redness foretells her 
impassioned behaviour. Pseudo-Aristotle says: ‘Impudence is signified by small, 
bright, wide-open eyes, with heavy bloodshot lids slightly bulging; high shoulder-
blades; a carriage of the body not erect, but crouched slightly forwards; quickness of 
movement; a reddish hue over the body; with a sanguine complexion, a round face, and 
high chest’ (Physiognomica 807b29-808a2). The redness on Medea too, is not just 
localized to her cheeks, but it covers her whole body ‘all over’ (ἄμυδις) at one point 
(3.725).
154
 The redness on Medea’s cheeks foreshadows her impudence and betrayal of 
her family and it foreshadows her as a rogue as, ‘too ruddy a hue marks a rogue 
(panourgos), as in the case of the fox’ (Physiognomica 812a12-812a26). 
 
In addition to impudence and desire, in physiognomic thought, the most 
frequent characteristic of redness on one’s body is a proneness to irascibility and 
passion: “Men of fierce temper bear themselves erect, are broad about the ribs and 
move with an easy gait; their bodies are of a reddish hue (epipurros)’ (Physiognomica 
808a20-808a23).
155
 Thus the redness of Medea’s cheeks also foreshadows her anger 
that she exhibits in Book 4, but more drastically, outside the limits of the Argonautika, 
in the plot of Euripides’ Medea.  
This overwhelmingly prevalent idea that redness of skin indicates anger and 
irascibility pervaded medical and philosophical thought into the Hellenistic period and 
persisted for a long time thereafter. This is largely in part due to the role given to the 
concept of internal heat in creating restlessness and impassioned behaviour. Pseudo-
Aristotle describes the importance of this concept of internal heat and how it influences 
mind and body thus: 
A red hue indicates hastiness, for all parts of the body on being heated by 
movement turn red. A flaming skin, however, indicates mania for it results from 
                                                   
152 Holmberg (1998) 154. 
153 Tsouna (1998) 184. 
154 Hunter (1989) 175; cf. 3.1012. 
155 cf. Physiognomica 808a33-808a33, 812a27-812b13. 
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an overheated body, and extreme bodily heat is likely to mean mania. Pathos 
brings this on. (Physiognomica 812a12-812a26)
156
 
Apollonios himself presents an increase of internal heat as the cause for 
Medea’s red skin in lines 3.285-98. Erōs’ manifestation in Medea is first expressed as 
fire burning beneath her heart, then as a blush upon her face. Apollonios here uses the 
simile of the wool-worker and the burning brand to represent the destructive power that 
erōs has over Medea. He emphasises the fire and shows it in full blaze to mimic the 
extremeness of the manic behaviour it causes. The redder the skin, the hotter the 
internal heat. The most severe characteristic of red skin is mania, as Aristotle says: 
There are solid earthy fibres in the thick blood which produce a passionate 
temperament and make it liable to outbursts of passions. For example passion 
(ὀργή) produces heat, and solids which are heated give off more heat. Fibres 
are solid, and when inside the blood, cause it to boil up, if fits of passion come 
on. Thus bulls and boars are liable to fits of passion because their blood is 
fibrous. (Aristotle, De Partibus Animalum 2.2 648a)
157
 
The presence of the image of love ‘burning’ is, of course evocative of Sappho. 
However, Apollonios in adapting Sappho’s image of burning love exaggerates it to the 
extreme. It is not a gentle flame that creeps beneath her skin (χρῶι πῦρ ὐπαδεδρόμηκεν 
fr. 31.10), it is an all-consuming fire that rages and it quickly and easily devours the 
twigs which represent Medea and consumes her very heart. Campbell posits that Medea 
is the wool-weaver, nourishing her own desire; however, he seems to have in mind the 
image of Dido, rather than Medea (Aeneid 4.1-2, 66-67). 
158
 As Matone notes, the 
wool-weaver is reminiscent of Aphrodite who is likened to a wool-weaver (Iliad 3.386-
87).
159
  It can be metaphorically seen then that love is stoking the flame, perhaps 
blowing on it, as erōs often blows and buffets Medea with its breezes. The fire is 
shown in full conflagration, devouring the passive victim Medea to show the 
heightened destructiveness of erōs in this poem. In fact, the image of fire in the form of 
                                                   
156 Galen too ascribed to the idea of internal heat and its effect on the mental condition: ‘If very much 
heat dominates, straightaway there is bitter anger, and madness and rashness’ (Ars Medica 10). 
157 See also Galen, Anim. Mor. Corp. Temp 4.796; De Placitis III 1.30-33; Part. Anim 24.650b. 
158 Campbell (1983) 28. 
159 Matone (1999) 68 discusses how this is also reminiscent of the wool-working woman in Iliad 12.433-
435: ‘But they held even, as the scales of a careful working-woman/ who holds the balance and draws up 
the wool in it on both sides/ making them equal, in order that she win a pitiful wage for her children:/ 
thus their battle and war-waging was stretched equally on each side.’ The woman weighing wool on 
scales evokes the image of Erōs determining fate with his golden ball. The tenor of the Homeric simile is 
the constant fighting on two battle lines and this foreshadows the constant internal battle that Medea 
faces. 
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an ember lying beneath ashes waiting to ignite as a symbol of love also occurs 
elsewhere in Hellenistic poetry.
160
 However, Apollonios inflates this image, as instead 
of playing with the suspense of the ember’s conflagration it is shown as a fire blazing 
in full force, raging within Medea.
161
 He shows the frightening potential of the pathē 
when in full blaze. In this simile, Apollonios also equates Erōs with strife, as he evokes 
another passage from the Iliad where strife quickly increases from nothing (as 
paralleled with the fire in Medea’s heart ἀθέσφατον ἐξὀλίγοιο):162 
 ...and Hatred (Eris) raging without cease,  
the sister comrade of Ares the man-slayer,  
who rears her head, tiny at first, but then 
her head reaches heaven while she walks on earth.  
She then tossed contention in the midst of both sides, equally,  
going through the multitude, increasing the groaning of men. (Iliad 4.440-445) 
Apollonios appropriates this image of strife to erōs as fire to foretell the 
overwhelming strife that erōs will cause in Medea’s life. The extreme heat of the flame 
is a representation and cause for the manic behaviour that she will exhibit. As Pseudo-
Aristotle says, this extreme internal heat causes mania, which Medea exhibits as 
symptoms of eros. To the informed reader, this flame (symbolic of increased internal 
heat) and flaming red cheeks foreshadows the manic behaviour that the audience is in 
suspense of for the whole poem; the angry, vengeful, hateful and cruel Medea that 
Euripides portrays. The image of this flame and the destruction it wreaks on its victims 
is also applied to Jason and the manifestation of it as a flush on Jason’s cheeks also 
marks the beginning of his ‘moral degradation’ because soon after he proposes the most 
disapproved plan: to kill Absurtos. In the moment when the fleece casts its light 
(ereuthetai) on Jason’s face the flush is ‘like a flame’ (phlogi eikelon) (4.173). This 
recalls the only other time this exact phrase phlogi eikelon appears in the poem which is 
to describe how the arrow burned in Medea’s heart.163 Just as Medea soon exhibits 
questionable behaviour, so too does Jason. Just as the fire burns in Medea to create 
mania, so too does this happen in Jason.
164
  
                                                   
160 cf. Callimachus, Epigrams 44. 1-2; Homer, Od 5.488-491.  
161 Matone (1999) 72. 
162 Matone (1999) 73.  
163 The fleece also ‘shone like Zeus’ lightning’ (4.185) which recalls the bolt that strikes Medea. 
164 Rose remarks that Jason will henceforth lose his innocence and when he returns to the ship he holds 
onto the fleece fearing that a god or man may take it (4.181-82), he keeps it hidden from his companions 
and tries to hide it (4.184) which foreshadows his jealousy and selfishness. At 4.180 he bears parallels 
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Apollonios uses physiognomy’s original function: to predict what kind of 
behaviour people might exhibit. The subtleties behind what a red face means 
physiognomically and probably culturally give a pseudo-medical hint to the audience as 
to what kind of person Medea will become. It indicates what kind of behaviour she has 
the propensity to exhibit. The lack of differentiation physically between the different 
types of blush and whether they are an indication of desire, anger, fear or joy is very 
much in line with the Stoic concept of the pathē, as they were not generally 
differentiated in the symptoms they create. The focus was more on the way that a 
pathos affects the psyche and body. In this way, the red blush which Medea exhibits on 
her cheeks becomes not only a symbol of her desire for Jason but also a symbol of her 
future anger, and in general her susceptibility to passions in general, and her 
consequent ease at being overwhelmed by them. 
Apollonios’ focus on the blush, which is such a delicate expression, betrays his 
interest in facial expression to convey psychology and character. Eyes in particular 
were of interest in revealing character and Apollonios also includes a focus on the eyes 
and their role in revealing Medea’s character and psychological states. Timomachos’ 
Medea, for example was lauded for the detail of her eyes and their conveyance of 
indecision: ‘This is the sketch of Medea. Observe how she raises one eye to anger, and 
softens the other towards sympathy for her children’ (APl 143).165 Aristotle assigns 
much importance to the eyes and discusses their role in physiognomy in revealing the 
character of a person to the world. In the Argonautika too, Medea’s eyes convey her 
internal psychological turmoil. 
Every moment the plot turns Apollonios shows the reaction on someone’s face, 
delving into the characters’ psyche and revealing, albeit often subtly, their 
psychological state.
166
 This is most frequently achieved through description of eyes and 
their movement. In the Argonautika the eyes can convey desire, anger, modesty and 
shame, boldness, sexual deviancy, anxiousness and internal contemplation. It is through 
allusions to physiognomy that Apollonios is able to depict such recognizable emotions. 
A common description of the eyes in the Argonautika is that they are ‘fixed on the 
ground’ which reveals internal psychological indecision. Pseudo-Aristotle describes the 
                                                                                                                                                    
with Argos (1.325) and Herakles which foreshadows his abandonment of the diplomatic code. Rose 
(1985) 39. 
165 Gurd (1974) 316. 
166 Evans (1969) 62. 
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role of the eyes in revealing internal character as: ‘A slow movement of the eyes which 
allows a tinge of white to show all the time, so that they look stationary, indicates a 
reflective character; for when the mind is absorbed in reflection, our eyes also are 
motionless’ (Physiognomica 813a30). Stationary eyes are considered a manifestation of 
the indecision. Athena and Hera both fix their eyes on the ground while they ponder 
what to do (3.22) and Jason does the same thing when thinking about how to respond to 
Aietes’ anger (3.422), as does Medea when she is anxiously worrying about Jason’s 
fate (3.1063). In these moments in addition to the fixed eyes there is usually a verbal 
indication of indecision and contemplation, such as amēchanos..167 When the eyes are 
fixed on the ground Apollonios provides the audience with a visual image of that 
person’s indecision.168 
In reverse, the opposite of this transfixion is the eyes’ inability to keep still. 
Rapid moving eyes in the Argonautika indicate Medea’s anxiousness, anticipation and 
lust for the object of her desire.
169
 When Medea is waiting for Jason, Apollonios says: 
 
Οὐδ'  ἄρα Μηδείης θυμὸς τράπετ'  ἄλλα νοῆσαι,  
μελπομένης περ ὅμως. πᾶσαι δέ οἱ, ἥν τιν' ἀθύροι 
μολπήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δηρὸν ἐφήνδανεν ἑψιάασθαι,  
ἀλλὰ μεταλλήγεσκεν ἀμήχανος· οὐδέ ποτ' ὄσσε  
ἀμφιπόλων μεθ' ὅμιλον ἔχ' ἀτρέμας, ἐς δὲ κελεύθους  
τηλόσε παπταίνεσκε παρακλίνουσα παρειάς. (3.947-53) 
Medea was unable to keep concentration,  
and whatever games she played, none gave her  
pleasure or kept her amused for long,  
but she kept stopping, confused. Nor could she 
keep her eyes fixed on her group of maidservants, but she would 
constantly turn her cheek sideways and with a searching glance peers into the 
distance along the path.  
 
Pseudo-Aristotle says: ‘Mobile eyes signify keenness and rapacity, as in hawks’ 
(Physiognomica 813a20). Hippocrates also notices that rapid movements of the pupils 
occurs in patients suffering from delirium, which often leads to madness (Hippocrates, 
                                                   
167 Amēchanos is often translated as ‘helplessness’ but in these instances, it reflects a moment of 
psychological indecision and hesitation to act. It complements intense internal deliberation and 
concentration (cf. 2.681, 3.423, 3.951, 4.136). It is also commonly found with speechlessness (aphasia) 
and physical paralysis. 
168 See the Herculaneum and the Pompeii Medeas. 
169 The alliteration of 3.953 emphasises the speed and emotional charge of Medea’s glances; Hunter 
(1989) 201. 
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Prognostics 7). Medea exhibits a similar madness and pursues Jason. The rapidity of 
Medea’s eyes and her keenness for Jason is also mimicked in Medea’s body language 
(3.649-53), in her moments of indecision (3.771) and in her rapid heart-beat (3.658) 
Restlessness is also described by Pseudo-Aristotle as ‘lethargic movements are a sign 
of a soft character, rapid movements of a passionate person (enthermon)’ 
(Physiognomica 806b25-806b26). This restlessness is inherently caused by an increase 
in internal heat. In addition, Pseudo-Aristotle says that men with ‘dry tissues’ and 
people who have red skin are not ‘persistent’ and cannot linger on one idea for a long 
period of time. Instead, they rapidly move onto something new. This is because the 
redness is caused by blood flowing rapidly within a limited space, which produces heat 
(Physiognomica 813b6-813b35).
170
 Here the link between internal fever, redness and 
rapacity is made clear by Pseudo-Aristotle, and the inclusion of all of these symptoms 
in Medea’s symptomology proves that her restlessness and her quick movements are a 
result of the fever burning inside her. The rapidity of Medea’s eye movements 
represent her longing for Jason, and to portray this same psychological insight 
Apollonios employs the side-ways glance.  
 
Medea also shows her lust for Jason when she tried to sneak a peek to the side 
to get a glimpse of her beloved. This side-ways glance signifies Medea’s longing and 
the subsequent abandonment of her shame. When she first sees Jason Medea throws 
glances at him (αἰεὶ βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα 3.287)171 and when Medea first 
dares to inspect Jason in the hall she ‘kept her eyes on him, looking sideways (λοξά) 
behind her shining veil’ (3.445) and when she is waiting for Jason’s arrival to their 
meeting, she likewise casts long side-ways glances (παπταίνεσκε παρακλίνουσα) to the 
road in search of him.
172
 Pseudo-Aristotle says of this, ‘Sidelong leering (ἐγκλιδόν) 
glances are held to be characteristic of a fop (kinaidos)’ (Physiognomica 813a25). The 
main characteristic of a ‘fop’ is effeminacy and sexual lewdness, and in this way, we 
may view the sideways glance as a gaze that signifies both Medea’s sexual appetite, 
and the impropriety of it. ‘Hypsipyle ‘turns her eyes aside (ἐγκλιδόν) in her attempt to 
show maidenly shame (1.774) but addresses Jason anyway. Medea, when flattered 
                                                   
170 Evans (1969) 10. 
171 cf. Sappho, fr. 16.17-18. 
172 Ojennus argues this scene and the ones surrounding it are littered with marriage imagery, symbolizing 
Medea’s full commitment to Jason at this point; (2006) 269; Nishimura-Jensen (2009) 16. 
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looks aside (ἐγκλιδόν) in a moment of sexual desire (3.1008).173 Looking straight into 
another person’s eyes shows boldness, and for Medea it shows that she has abandoned 
her shame, for, ‘once again Medea addressed him face to face with mournful words, 
and took his right hand, for shame had left her eyes (ἀπ' ὀφθαλμοὺς λίπεν αἰδώς 
3.1068).
174
 So we can see how the moments of the eyes can reveal psychological states. 
 
In following this, avoiding someone’s eyes is a sign of modesty, shame and 
guilt. ‘Shameless’ Erōs himself only shows his shame in his eyes, ‘shameless though he 
is, for you he will show at least a little shame in his eyes’ (3.92-3).175 Medea and Jason 
too show shame and shyness in their eyes: ‘At one moment they both stared coyly 
(αἰδόμενοι) at the ground, at the next thy cast glances at each other, smiling with desire, 
their faces lit up’ (3.1022-4) and in her moments of guilt, Medea covers her eyes: when 
she is fleeing (4.45-6), and when she avoids seeing the murder and blood of her brother 
(4.465-70). After this both Jason and Medea avoid looking into people’s eyes as sign of 
guilt and this is most notably seen when they do not raise their eyes to meet Kirke 
(4.697-9). However, at the same time, when Medea and Jason do look at each other in 
the eyes, an incredible joy comes over them, and they share a tender gaze. This too 
according to Pseudo-Aristotle is a sign of a ‘fop’ because: ‘an upward roll of the eyes 
under the upper lids with a tender gaze and drooping eyelids, and in general all tender 
melting glances; we argue partly from congruity, partly from the fact that these looks 
are common in women’ (Physiognomica 813a25).  As well as to reveal psychological 
expressions, eyes are an indicator of Medea’s internal heat. Apollonios uses the eyes to 
intensify this romantic ecstasy and heightens Medea’s sensation through medical 
allusions. When she is in the full thrall of desire, Medea’s blush is accompanied with a 
mist that descends over her eyes. The misty eye first happens when Chalkiope asks 
Medea to help Jason so that her sons will be saved, and then again when Jason appears 
before Medea at their private meeting. The effects of Jason’s appearance (he is here 
likened to Sirius and bewitches Medea’s eyes) incites an exaggerated and violent 
                                                   
173 Garson (1972) 2. These two are identical half-lines: ἡ δ' ἐγκλιδὸν ὄσσε βαλοῦσα. Another moment 
where we see the sideways glance is when Medea is talking about fearing ‘the casting eyes of mockery’ 
(4.389). ἐπιλλίζω means both ‘look askance’ and ‘mock’, and although in this instance the meaning is 
clearly mock, in a moment of reversal the one who did cast sideways glances in lust, is now the passive 
agent, being looked at, and judged for that very sexual impropriety.  
174 cf. 4.1315, 2.680. 
175 cf. Theocr. 27.70. 
59 
 
physiological reaction that Apollonios himself likens to a sickness, one of the 
symptoms of which is misty eyes: 
αὐτὰρ ὅ γ' οὐ μετὰ δηρὸν ἐελδομένηι ἐφαάνθη,  
ὑψόσ' ἀναθρωισκων ἅ τε Σείριος  Ὠκεανοῖο,  
ὃς δ’ ἤτοι καλὸς μὲν ἀρίζηλός τ' ἐσιδέσθαι  
ἀντέλλει, μήλοισι δ' ἐν ἄσπετον ἧκεν ὀιζύν·   
ὧς ἄρα τῆι καλὸς μὲν ἐπήλυθεν εἰσοράασθαι  
Αἰσονίδης, κάματον δὲ δυσίμερον ὦρσε φαανθείς.  
ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ κραδίη στηθέων πέσεν, ὄμματα δ' αὔτως  
ἤχλυσαν, θερμὸν δὲ παρηίδας εἷλεν ἔρευθος·  
γούνατα δ' οὔτ' ὀπίσω οὔτε προπάροιθεν ἀεῖραι  
ἔσθενεν, ἀλλ' ὑπένερθε πάγη πόδας.  (3.956-65) 
Soon, however, Jason appeared to her as she longed for him,  
just like Sirius leaping high from Ocean, 
which  rises brilliant and clear to see, but to flocks it brings terrible misery.  
Just so did the son of Aison approach her, brilliant to behold,  
but his appearance roused the sickening torment of desire.  
Her heart dropped out of her chest, her eyes grew misty,  
and a hot flush seized her cheeks;  
she was not able to move her legs either forward or back,  
but her feet  were planted firm beneath her. 
This mist evokes both the mist that accompanies a warrior’s death in the Iliad 
(5.696, 16.344), and the mist that accompanies lovers’ eyes in Archilochus (fr. 103). 
Apollonios melds the misty eyes in the Argonautika to make them both a sign of sexual 
ecstasy and of painful disease-like death. He uses these tropes to help demonstrate the 
heightened pikros-glukos nature of his love’s sensation. The only other time in the 
Argonautika when mist descends over someone’s eyes is when Mopsos dies painfully 
from a snake bite: ‘Already beneath his skin his limb-relaxing sleep sank in, and a thick 
mist descended over his eyes; very soon his heavy limbs collapsed to the ground, and 
he grew cold beyond remedy’ (4.1524-27). This passage very much evokes the earlier 
image of Medea, and obvious similarities can be drawn; the mist over the eyes, the 
heaviness of the body and the lack of control over the limbs.
176
 Mopsos however, is 
cold. Medea burns hot.  Both the flush on her cheeks and her misty eyes are a sign of 
increased internal heat, and are symptoms of her fever.
177
 The Hippocratic author of 
                                                   
176 Temporary paralysis is a common symptom of love, Hunter (1989) 203. cf. Od 14.463-64; Theocr. 
2.110; HE 3214-17; Anacr, fr. 376 where Erōs, like wine has the ability to invade the mind and ‘muddle 
the limbs.’ Cyrino (1996) 372. 
177 cf. Hippocrates, Aphorisms 7.74; On Injuries of the Head 11; Prognostics 24 (occurs twice in this 
section).   
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Epidemics links misty eyes with fever, paralysis and mania (Hippocrates, Epidemics 
1.2.6.1). Although Medea is clearly ecstatic in her joy, the bitterness of her desire 
cannot be dismissed and these symptoms reveal to the audience (and to Jason) that 
Medea is sick with fever and may exhibit manic behaviour. In response to this, Jason 
treads very lightly; he flatters Medea and eventually promises to marry her in trade for 
her help.
178
 Just as the blush foretells that Medea will be susceptible to being passionate 
and manic, and the likening of erōs to a gadfly foretells insanity and disease, so too 
does the appearance of Sirius the Dog Star foretell Medea’s bodily fever-like disease.  
Apollonios compares Jason to the Dog Star and transfers to him all the 
associations of Sirius, the effects of which manifest in Medea as fever-like illness. 
Aratus says that Sirius’ brightness dominates the constellation of the Canis Major 
(Aratus, Phaenomena 326-7) and Sirius’ intense brightness is indeed its most 
noticeable feature in all ancient literature that discusses it. However, in Aratus’ 
Phaenomena we see for the first time the addition of constellation myths surrounding 
Sirius. Aratus tells us that the Dog Star ‘draws forth, as if guiding it, the constellation 
of the Argo’ (Aratus, Phaenomena 603-4).179  Jason’s repeated likeness to Sirius can be 
viewed as a further assertion of his position as rightful leader of the Argonauts.
180
  It is 
also by Apollonios’ lifetime that the ‘Golden Fleece’ is considered a constellation 
(Eratosthenes, Katasterismoi 19). 
181
 The prevalence of the Argonautika myth in the 
constellations of this period provides evidence for its continued popularity and 
cosmological importance. Through constellation mythologies we see the myth played 
out in the cosmos, and when Apollonios likens Jason to his cosmological counterpart, 
Sirius the Dog Star, he brings all of its associations with it like fever and disease. How 
the Dog Star effects the human world is being played out inside Medea as the 
manifestation of her desire.  
 
                                                   
178  This is in line with Jason’s preference of persuasion over violence (cf. 3.84, 3.183-85), for a 
discussion of this see Goldhill (1991) 303-5; Holmberg (1998) 137-154; Danielewicz argues that in 
showing this Apollonios uses an acrostic in lines 3.1008-11 to spell out ὠναο ‘you have profited’ 
emphasises Jason’s skill at flattery; (2005) 331-2.  
179 cf. Cicero, Aratea 388-89. 
180 Stover (2003) 135. 
181 Noegel (2004) 132. 
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Figure 2: Star chart based on Aratus’ Phaenomena, from A. W. Mair and G. R. Mair, 
trans., Callimachus’ Hymns and Epigrams, Lycophron, and Aratus, Loeb Classical 
Library, 129 (1921; rev. ed. 1955; reprint, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989). 
 
 The most pertinent reason that Jason is likened to Sirius the Dog Star is the 
effect that he has on the women in the Argonautika. Homer first uses the image of 
Sirius to represent martial prowess and when he applies it to both Diomedes and 
Achilles he uses it to enhance their aristeia, and to highlight their power to cut down 
their foes (Iliad 5.4-8; 22.25-35)
182
 just as Sirius ravages flocks and crops. This was 
already an established thought because Sirius rises at the end of July and marks the 
onset of the hottest days of the year.  Homer says, ‘It is the brightest star, but it is an 
evil sign and brings great fever upon wretched mortals’ (Iliad 22.25-35). It is Hesiod 
                                                   
182 cf. Sirius used to display martial prowess 3.1269ff; Aeneid 10.270-75; Valerius Flaccus, Argonautika 
6.607-8. See Goldhill (1991) 306-7 for discussion. 
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who first associates Sirius with sexual mania, when he states it is the period when 
women are the most ‘wanton’ (Hesiod, Works and Days 586).  The negative effects that 
Sirius has on people gains medical credibility in the works of Hippocrates, as he states, 
‘One must also guard against the risings of stars, especially the Dog Star, then of 
Arcturus, and also of the setting of the Pleiades. For it is especially at these times that 
disease comes to a crisis’ (Hippocrates, Airs Waters Places XI.10).183 This Hippocratic 
author associates Sirius with the climax of disease, and so when Jason is likened to the 
Dog Star it signifies disastrous ruin for Medea, both sexually and medically.
184
 
Sirius the Dog Star literally incites in Medea a fever: her symptoms of misty 
eyes, blush and paralysis reflect this. Another way that Medea’s fever and excitement 
as a result of her pathos manifests in Medea’s body is through her palpitating pulse. 
Apollonios, in incorporating a reference to the contemporary advances on pulse theory 
adds realism to Medea’s symptomology. This reference appears in the passage just 
before Medea’s final monologue about her indecision and her erratic heart-beat reflects 
this:  
πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν,  
ἠελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἔνι πάλλεται αἴγλη,  
ὕδατος ἐξανιοῦσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι  
ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῶι κέχυται, ἡ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα  
ὠκείηι στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται ἀίσσουσα   
ὧς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης. (3.755-760) 
  
Often her heart fluttered wildly in her chest.  
As when in a house, a sunbeam dances which is 
reflected off water that has just been poured into a bowl 
or a bucket, and darts this way and that  
as it is shaken in a rapid swirl. 
Just so did the young girl’s heart whirl in her breast. 
This allusion to a fast pulse conveys to the audience Apollonios’ knowledge of 
contemporary medical advances on the pulse and the advances in the knowledge of its 
sympathetic relationship with pathē. A fast erratic pulse became representative 
medically of both fever and also a psychological pathos. 
                                                   
183 cf. Hesiod, Works and Days 417; Manilus, Astronomica 1.398-404. 
184 cf. He appears to the Lemnian women like a star. Hunter says this is Hesperos, the evening star which 
is associated with love and marriage; (1989) 202. cf. Catullus 62; Seneca, Medea 56ff. 
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Apollonios shows Medea with an erratic pulse because he draws on the works 
of Herophilos, who connected an erratic pulse to an increase in internal heat as a 
symptom of fever, as Marcellinus (1
st
 century AD physician) attests: 
What Herophilos’ position concerning the pulse of those suffering from fever is: 
Herophilos gave the opinion that a person has a fever whenever his pulse 
becomes more frequent, bigger, and stronger [and is] accompanied by a high 
internal temperature. So, if the pulse loses its strength and magnitude, [it is] 
because the fever is getting [some] relief. The frequency of the pulse-beats, on 
the other hand, not only first arises when the fevers begin, but then also 
continues to linger up to the complete remission of the fever – thus Herophilos. 
There is a story that Herophilos had such confidence in the frequency of the 
pulse, using it as a reliable diagnostic sign, that he constructed a water-clock 
capable of containing a specified amount for the natural pulses of each age. 
And, upon entering to visit a patient, he would set up his water-clock and feel 
the pulse of the person suffering from a fever. By as much as the movements of 
the pulse exceeded the number that is natural for filling up the water-clock, by 
that much he declared the [patient’s] pulse too frequent – that is, that [the 
patient] had either more or less of a fever.  (Marcellinus, De Pulsibus 11) 
Herophilos here draws a clear link between the strength of the internal heat with 
fever and the degree that the pulse deviates from its usual state.
185
 In the Argonautika, 
the fluttering of the heart is most certainly evocative of a fast beating pulse.
186
 
Apollonios continues this image into the simile by making the ray of light also 
symbolize Medea’s heart and her atypical pulse, restless movements and indecision.187 
The ray of light is described as being reflected on water just stirred, which creates a 
sporadic dispersal of light, the image of which represents the sporadic beat of Medea’s 
pulse. Apollonios is very fond of painting an image of reflected light, which is quite un-
Homeric, and this is most likely due to this kind of imagery emerging in Hellenistic 
painting.
188
 The question is, why does Apollonios choose this image in particular to 
convey the heart-beat? The ray of light is an appropriate model for Medea’s psyche 
because it is discussed as such in philosophy. The comparison of the atoms of the soul 
to dust particles seen floating in sunlight is an idea that persists through philosophic 
                                                   
185 Atkins (1985) 339. 
186 Zanker (2004) 63. 
187 Hunter (1989) 179. This image is recreated at Aenied 8.18-25. Democritus too, equates soul with 
nous. (Aristotle, De Anima 404a25-30) 
188  Phinney Jr. (1967) 147. cf 1.1280-82; 4.167-71. Phinney Jr. Also discusses a trend of popular 
paintings in the Hellenistic period where reflection of light is admired, especially a painting of a boy 
blowing on a fire and the light thrown on the boy’s face by Antiphilus; (1967) 147. See also Zanker 
(2004) 61ff. for a discussion on this trend.  
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thought
189
 and the first occurrence can be seen in Aristotle’s De Anima where he speaks 
of Democritus’ theory: ‘soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his ‘forms’ or atoms are 
infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them 
to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows’ 
(Aristotle, De Anima 404a1-5).
190
 The Stoics considered the soul to be made up of 
pneuma and fire
191
 and to them, a ray of light (αἴγλη) was seen to be a ‘kindling of a 
sudden fire’ (Diog. Laert., Lives 7.81). Thus the ray of light flickering around the room 
as a reflection of the water is both a representation of Medea’s restless and perturbed 
psyche, and of the fire that ceaselessly burns in Medea’s heart causing her fever and in 
response, an increased pulse.   
The first person to write extensively about the significance of the pulse was 
Praxagoras of Cos (c. 340 BC) who influenced Herophilos, Erasistratos and 
Chrusippos. Praxagoras was the first to distinguish between arteries and veins and held 
that while arteries contained pneuma, veins contained blood.
192
 With regards to the 
pulse, he postulated that it was the movement of pneuma through the arteries that 
caused pulsation. He had tried to prove through experiments that the pneuma was 
thought to be propelled throughout the body independent of any other organ (De 
Placitis VIII 702).
193
 In a strange automaton like fashion, pulsation was thought to 
occur independently of the heart and Praxagoras did not differentiate it from any other 
arterial movements and considered it muscular (Galen, De Pulsuum Differentiis 4.2).
194
 
Herophilos advancing on his tutor’s ideas, assigned the heart as the mechanism behind 
pulsation (De Placitis VIII 703). However it was Erasistratos who first correctly 
identified the heart as acting like a pump pushing the pneuma through the arteries. He 
likens the heart's pumping to the image of bellows.
195
 The fact that Medea’s heart has 
such a prominent role in the representation of her pulsation implies that Apollonios was 
aware of this and incorporated it into his description. As the first to realise that the heart 
controlled pulsation, Herophilos identified the variation in pulsation as a physiological 
                                                   
189 cf. Lucretius 2. 112-24; Epictetus 3.3.30-2; Dio Chryst. 21.14. The image of water rippling is used by 
the Stoics to explain hearing, ‘We hear because the air between the speaker and the hearer is struck in a 
spherical manner; and is then agitated in waves, resembling the circular eddies which one sees in a 
cistern when a stone is dropped into it.’ (Diog. Laert., Lives 7.158). 
190 Heracleitus also conceived the soul as fire (Vorsokr. 22b36); cf. Solmsen (1957) 119. 
191 cf. Galen, On the History of the Soul 4. 
192 Longrigg (1988) 467. 
193 Longrigg (1988) 469. 
194 Longrigg (1993) 203. 
195 Longrigg (1988) 479. Bellows were also used in therapeutics to distend an obstructed cavity; Gundert 
(1992) 462. 
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reaction to emotional and physical distress, and therefore tried to utilize its potential for 
diagnosis and therapy. Deviances in the pulse correlated to internal deviances. He 
created a system to catalogue the different pulses and their meanings focusing on size, 
strength, rate and rhythm (De Placitis VIII 592).
196
 His system employed musical 
terminology
197
 to describe the different types of rhythm.  He  devised metaphorical 
terms derived from the  supposed resemblance to  the  gait  of  certain animals  such  as  
‘capering’  (dorkadizon,  i.e.,  like  a gazelle, De Placitis VIII 556), ‘crawling’  
(myrmekizon, i.e.,  like  an  ant,  De Placitis IX 453) and others, which remained in use 
for centuries.
198
   He organized a way to name the different kinds of pulses, and a way 
for them to be easily recognisable by creating a system of pulse analysis based around 
metrical feet; spondee, troche, and pyrrhic. He also assigned a typical type of pulse to 
the different ages and if  the pulse diverged from its normal state, it was a clear 
indication that something was wrong within the body, and Herophilos identified three 
main types of abnormal pulse the ‘pararrythmic’, ‘heterorrhythmic’,  and ‘ekrhythmic’. 
Of these, the first indicates merely a slight divergence from normality, the second a 
greater and the third the greatest (De Placitis IX 471). 
199
 As with most physiological 
functions, deviating from its regular state is representative of something wrong. This is 
why Herophilos in particular tried to understand and measure it, because he thought it 
would reveal something otherwise invisible. He invented a klepsydra that he took with 
him on visits to patients which was supposed to measure and catalogue his patients’ 
pulses in order that he better understand the nature of their illness. The very fact that 
the ray of light representative of Medea’s pulse is being measured in some way by 
water (which is absent in Democritus’ description) is evocative of Herophilos’ use of 
the klepsydra in his pulse diagnosis.  
The physiological effects that fever as well as pathē have on the pulse is 
demonstrated by Erasistratos through his treatment of Antiochus. At around the same 
time as Herophilos’ foray into pulse theory, Erasistratos is said to have employed 
similar techniques in perhaps the most famous and repeated example of the power of 
                                                   
196 cf. Archigenes apud Galen, De Pulsuum Differentiis 2.6  
197 This is thought to be derived from Aristoxenus of Tarentum (Galen, De Placitis IX.463); Longrigg 
(1988) 470. cf. Rufus Ephesius, Synopsis De Pulsibus 4. 
198 cf. Galen, De Pulsuum Differentiis 1.28; Marcellinus, De Pulsibus 31. 
199 Some further light is thrown upon those terms by the pseudo-Galenic treatise Definitiones Medicae 
XIX.409.  Its  author,  citing Bacchius and Zeno,  two  medical disciples of  Herophilos, here 
distinguishes the  ‘parar- rhythmic’  pulse as  one which does not possess the  rhythm  characteristic  of 
the  age  of the patient,  the  ‘heterorrhythmic’  as  possessing  the  rhythm  of  another  age,  and  the  
‘ek- rhythmic’  as  possessing a rhythm  which does not correspond  to  any age.’ Longrigg (1988) 470. 
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physicians’ diagnosis and prognosis. Erasistratos treated the ill Antiochus, son of King 
Seleucus, who was suffering from a mystery ailment which proved to be frustrated love 
for his mother in law, Stratonice.
200
 Erasistratos determines this diagnosis through 
analysing the symptoms that he exhibits, including the pulse. The widespread retelling 
of this story shows the popularity of pulse theory and fever analysis in diagnosis and 
prognosis, even though the klepsydra does not seem to have persisted as a measuring 
tool.
201
 The revolutionary status of Herophilos’ pulse theory advancements are 
described by Galen as ‘inaugurating a new era’ in medicine and the fact that 
Erasistratos’ proved that he could diagnose psychological love-sickness from it attests 
to its remarkability in revealing hidden causes.
202
 Plutarch in his Life of Demetrius tells 
the story as such:  
Antiochus was distressed and for a time he struggled to conceal his passion. But 
at last he decided that his malady was incurable, his desires sinful and his 
reason too weak to resist them: he therefore determined to make his escape 
from life and to destroy himself gradually by neglecting his body and refusing 
all nourishment, under the pretext that he was suffering from disease. 
Erasistratos, his physician, found no difficulty in diagnosing his condition, 
namely that he was in love, but it was less easy to discover with whom. He made 
a habit of spending day after day in the young prince’s room, and when any 
particularly good looking girl or young man entered, he would study his 
patient’s face minutely and watch those parts and movements of the body which 
nature has formed as to reflect and share the emotions of the soul. Sure enough, 
when anybody else came in, Antiochus remained unmoved, but whenever 
Stratonice visited him, as she often did either alone or with Seleucus, all the 
symptoms which Sappho describes immediately showed themselves: his voice 
faltered, his skin began to flush, his eye became languid, a sudden sweat broke 
out on his skin, his heart began to beat violently and irregularly, and finally as 
if his soul was overpowered by his passions, he would sink into a state of 
helplessness, prostration and pallor.’ (Plutarch, Vita Demetrii 38. 2907a) 
Erasistratos here used not only the pulse, but other established manifestations of 
fever to diagnose Antiochus. Erasistratos proves interested in the very physical signs 
that physiognomy is interested in: voice, skin colour, eyes. In addition to this, the rapid 
heart-beat is included as a symptom of a pathos. The similarities between Antiochus’ 
love-sickness and Medea’s are poignant and apparent. The pathos affects the body 
because of the psycho-somatic relationship between body and psyche: the affections of 
                                                   
200 Longrigg (1993) 182. 
201 Longrigg (1993) 205. 
202 Longrigg (1993) 203. 
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the psyche become the affections of the body because the soul is corporeal. This 
demonstrates the medicalization of love in the Hellenistic period, and how physical 
symptomology was being used to interpret unusual psychological behaviour.  An 
example of this is the fact that the Stoics equated a pathos with a nosema ‘disease’. A 
nosema to the Stoics was considered both a sickness of the psyche and of the body, as 
was a pathos.
203
 The psukhē and body are irrepealably sympathetically connected.  
Apollonios builds on this idea in his Medea as her increased pulse is the physical 
manifestation of her erōs-induced psychological turmoil.  
The image of the fire raging in Medea’s chest is evocative of internal heat and 
also shows parallels with how Erasistratos constructed the relationship of fire-pneuma 
in the heart. Hippocrates also discusses the image of the heart and fire: ‘Thus cold 
pneuma must be constantly drawn inward by the hottest parts of the body—i.e., the 
heart and associated large vessels—just as it is pulled up by a flame or by burning 
wood (Hippocrates, Fleshes 6).
204
 Thus we see that the image of burning wood is used 
as an analogy to the functioning of the heart in medical literature. Erasistratos describes 
the actions of the heart as thus and makes the heart the pump behind the pulse: 
‘material does not rush in spontaneously, as into some inanimate vessel, but the heart 
itself, dilating like a coppersmith’s bellows, draws the material in, filling the 
diastole.’205 Just as bellows nourish a fire and incite the sudden conflagration, so too 
does erōs tend the fire that rages in Medea’s heart.206 Apollonios later explicitly brings 
up the image of bellows and fire to provide a parallel of Medea’s heart as a furnace and 
to demonstrate how destructive erōs is: 
ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἐνὶ τρητοῖσιν ἐύρρινοι χοάνοισι  
φῦσαι χαλκήων ὁτὲ μέν τ' ἀναμαρμαίρουσι  
πῦρ ὀλοὸν πιμπρᾶσαι, ὅτ' αὖ λήγουσιν ἀυτμῆς,  
δεινὸς δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ πέλεται βρόμος, ὁππότ' ἀίξηι   
νειόθεν· ὧς ἄρα τώγε θοὴν φλόγα φυσιόωντες  
ἐκ στομάτων ὁμάδευν, τὸν δ' ἄμφεπε δήϊον αἶθος  
                                                   
203 Inwood & Gerson (2008) 207. 
204 Frixione (2012) 54. Other mentions of burning wood in medical thought: Regimen explains that water 
‘is consumed to nourish the fire which assails it;’ Hippocrates, Regimen 1, 3; While Fleshes states: ‘we 
know that the nourishment of hot is cold; Hippocrates, Fleshes 6; similarly, according to Breaths, ‘wind 
[pneuma] is food for fire;’ Hippocrates, Breaths 3; and Nature of the Child concurs in that ‘the heat in 
the [burning] wood draws in cold air...to nourish itself;’ Hippocrates, Nature of the Child 12. 
205Longrigg (1993) 206. The image of ‘blowing’ in the heart, like Erasistratos’ image of the bellows is 
also seen in Stoic thought: impressions arise in us as if vaporized from the heart and as if they were 
pushing out against someone and were blowing into the face and hands (Galen, De Placitis III 1.22-25). 
206 For the image of erōs as a blacksmith, see Anacreon, fr. 413. 
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βάλλον ἅ τε στεροπή· κούρης δέ ἑ φάρμακ' ἔρυτο. (3.1299-1305) 
 
As when the tough leather bellows of the blacksmiths  
penetrate the pierced furnaces and cause sparks to leap 
out whenever they stoke the destructive fire, but then rest from 
their blowing and the fire crackles fiercely as it leaps up  
from below; just so was the noise as fiery flame flashed out from 
the bulls’ mouths, and the blaze enveloped Jason, 
striking him like a lightning bolt; but Medea’s drugs protected him.  
Here many verbal echoes can be seen: bellows stoke the deadly fire. The fire is 
here destructive (ὀλοὸν as at 3.297 οὖλος ἔρως), and it is shown in full blaze (αἶθος as 
at 3.296 αἴθετο). The locus of the conflagration is also specifically identified. The fire 
in the furnace leaps fiercely up from below (νειόθεν) which Hunter explains is where 
the bellows would be applied.
207
  Likewise, the fire in Medea’s chest burns beneath 
(νέρθεν ὑπό) Medea’s heart like a flame (3.286-7).’ The image of the destructiveness of 
this fire being inflicted on people through the form of a bolt is also recalled as the fire 
from the bull’s mouth is also likened to a bolt, a thunderbolt.  However Jason, unlike 
Medea has protection from it. The fire through its verbal echoes to erōs bears with it the 
associations of erōs. The fire that burns (πιμπρᾶσαι) has a medical flavour meaning 
‘fever’, which is what erōs incites in Medea.208 Apollonios thus equates the destructive 
fire which erōs nourishes inside Medea’s heart with the destructive fire that bellows 
nourish in a furnace, alluding to Erasistratos’ description of the heart and the 
relationship with fire and fever. 
Medea’s pathos manifests itself in Medea’s body as physical symptoms of 
fever, the analysis of which reveals to the physician that a pathos exists. Through the 
medicalization of erōs’ physical manifestations, pathē could be identified not only 
through erratic mental behaviour but through physical signs. In addition to Apollonios 
showing erōs manifest as fever, blushes, eye movements and increased pulse-rate, 
Apollonios also shows erōs manifesting itself as pure physical pain. In describing 
Medea’s physical somatic pain realistically, Apollonios constructs Medea’s experience 
by incorporating the latest discoveries in explaining somatic sensation: the nervous 
system. It is through Apollonios’ description of the nervous system at work in Medea’s 
                                                   
207 Hunter (1989) 243. 
208 The fire also leaps aisso (ἀίξηι) just as Erōs does at 3.286. Apollonios uses this verb for fiery imagery. 
The ray of light also darts (aissousa) around the room (3.759) which represent Medea’s fevered pulse-
rate. 
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body that he is able to, for the first time, describe the emotional suffering that affects 
the heart, as the traditional seat of emotion, as manifesting itself somatically in a 
physiologically accurate way. As a result, he can create a fusion of traditional poetic, 
with contemporary, scientific, realism. In this passage Apollonios investigates the 
relationship that the heart has, as the locus of emotions, with the nervous system which 
transfers somatic sensation around the body. This investigation reveals Apollonios’ 
engagement in the contemporary dialogue about the physiology, anatomy and 
hegemony of the body. With the inclusion of the nervous system the audience is invited 
to examine the physiology that Apollonios applies to Medea, and how his description 
compares with those of physicians and philosophers.  
Apollonios incorporates the most recent and innovative ideas on somatic pain 
and sensation to provide a realistic model of how Medea’s pathos interacts with the 
psukhē in its psychosomatic relationship with the body.  The climax of Medea’s 
emotional pain becoming manifest as physical pain is when she gets her severe 
headache because of her mental anguish: 
δάκρυ δ' ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλέωι ῥέεν· ἔνδοθι δ' αἰεί  
τεῖρ' ὀδύνη, σμύχουσα διὰ χροὸς ἀμφί τ' ἀραιὰς  
ἶνας καὶ κεφαλῆς ὑπὸ νείατον ἰνίον ἄχρις,  
ἔνθ' ἀλεγεινότατον δύνει ἄχος, ὁππότ' ἀνίας  
ἀκάματοι πραπίδεσσιν ἐνισκίμψωσιν Ἔρωτες. (3.761-65) 
 
Tears were flowing from her eyes in pity, and pain was  
always wearing her away inside, burning through her skin, around her fine  
nerves and even as far as the lowest base of the occiput from under her head,  
where, the most unbearable pain sinks in, whenever 
the untiring Erotes should hurl sorrows into her heart. 
 
The superlatives in lines 3.751-65 νείατον (deepest) and ἀλεγεινότατον (most 
painful) help demonstrate that this passage is the climax, the pinnacle of Medea’s 
ongoing emotional pain. It also suggests that the area around the occipital bone, as the 
epicentre of the nervous system, is centre of the real somatic pain. The pain slowly 
hones in on the most sensitive spot, making its way from larger areas to smaller,
209
 it 
makes its way through the skin, then the nerves, then to the occipital bone and the heart 
                                                   
209 Hunter (1989) 180. 
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is the impetus for this pain transfer. The Erotes fire emotional pain upon (ἐνισκίμψωσιν 
3.765) Medea’s heart, and the very word that Apollonios uses evokes the arrow which 
Aphrodite begs Erōs to fire (ἐνισκίμψῃς 3.153) at Medea which also has the heart as the 
target.
210
 
It is clear that both the brain and the heart play a very important role in the 
psychopathology of Medea’s desire and anguish. And it is evident that Apollonios 
adopts the contemporary discovery of the nervous system to explain somatic sensation 
and pain, but ultimately follows Chrusippos’ model that the heart is the hēgemonikon 
and receives the emotion, and the somatic pain comes in response to the emotional pain 
in the hēgemonikon. Chrusippos, in granting the validity of the discovery of the nervous 
system argues that it does not prove that the brain is the hēgemonikon as Herophilos 
and Erasistratos think. In fact, he argues that even though the brain is the source of the 
nerves, the stimuli come from the heart as the seat of intellect and the locus of 
emotions.
211
 Indeed this is the model that Apollonios follows, for the pain travels 
through the nervous system ‘whenever the untiring Erotes should hurl sorrows into her 
heart’. Apollonios retards the mention of the heart as the locus of emotions until the last 
line of the verse to add forceful emphasis to its role as the impetus of the whole process 
of somatic sensation. 
This dialogue centres on the discovery of the nervous system which was 
occurring in Alexandria. Hellenistic Alexandria provided a unique environment which 
enabled significant scientific and intellectual progresses to occur. The patronage and 
encouragement of the Ptolemies to create an intellectual environment, through which 
they could show off their wealth and establish Alexandria as a centre of culture and 
scholarship funded the research of physicians such as Herophilos (and most likely 
Erasistratos)
212
 and also financed the city’s museum and library, which in turn acted as 
research facilities and intellectual forums.
213
  Apollonios, as Chief Librarian was in the 
midst of this intellectual research and had access to countless texts ranging across all 
genres.
214
 Alexandria was a centre of medicine and in the forefront of the development 
                                                   
210 Hunter (1989) 180. 
211 Tielman (1996) 195. 
212 Longrigg (1988) 473. 
213 Other notable people invited to work in Alexandria were Philetas, Eratosthenes, Archimedes, Straton 
of Lampascus; see Luce (1988) 25. 
214  There is already evidence that Apollonios’ contemporary Callimachus was influenced by the 
gynaecological and ophthalmological writings of Herophilos; Most (1981) 193. 
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of understandings of anatomy, due in most to the dissection and vivisection of humans 
performed by Herophilos and Erasistratos.
215
 Von Staden puts forward the theory that 
Alexandria was an unparalleled setting for the evolution of medicine, for a few 
reasons:
216
  
The unusual combination of ambitious Macedonian patrons of science (i.e. the 
Ptolemies), eager scientists like Herophilus, a new city in which traditional 
values at first were not considered intrinsically superior, and a cosmopolitan 
intelligentsia committed not only to literary and political, but also to scientific 
frontiersmanship, apparently made it possible to overcome traditional 
inhibitions against opening the human body. 
Prior to this, the only dissections that occurred in the Greek world were 
performed on animals, and even this practice was relatively new, as it is thought to 
have started at the Lyceum under Aristotle.
217
 The limitations of comparative animal 
dissection however involve the substitution of animal anatomy and physiology onto 
humans, which does not always prove very accurate.
218
  Human dissection and 
vivisection not only occurred in Alexandria by Herophilos, and probably 
Erasistratos,
219
 but was actually sanctioned by the state, as prisoners were provided for 
the experiments.
220
 Longrigg suggests that because of the taboo nature of human 
dissection and vivisection they would have been more likely to have taken place within 
a relatively closed intellectual society, like that of the Museum, rather than in an 
iatreion in the city.
221
The environment was anomalous and only lasted perhaps 50 
years, and no other human vivisections and no other dissections, outside of Alexandria, 
are known to have been performed until the early 14
th
 century AD by Mondino Dei 
Luicci. Galen, who worked in Alexandria only a few hundred years after Herophilos, 
gained most of his anatomical knowledge from his dissections on the Barbary ape and 
                                                   
215 Longrigg (1988) 457. These dissections were in part perhaps influenced by contemporary ideas about 
the corporeality of the soul and life after death. Chrusippos, in his argument for corporeality of the soul 
argues ‘Death is separation of soul from body; but nothing incorporeal is separated from body; for an 
incorporeal does not even make contact with a body but the soul both makes contact with, and is 
separated from, the body; therefore the soul is a body.’ (Nemesius, SVF 11.790); Long (1996) 236.  
216 Von Staden (1989) 141-2. 
217 Longrigg (1993) 184. 
218 Edelstein (1967) 295. 
219 Longrigg (1993) 183. 
220 For the best discussion of this see Edelstein (1967) 247-302; he convincingly argues that dissection 
first occurred in Alexandria under Herophilos and then remained only in Alexandria practiced by the 
practitioners in the academies for medical teaching. cf. Von Staden (1989). 
221 Longrigg (1993) 179. 
72 
 
the Rhesus monkey.
222
 Longrigg posits that the reason for the short-lived life of this 
practice is in part due to the negative rather than positive attention the practice 
ultimately received.
223
 Nevertheless, the lasting result was the discovery of the nervous 
system which Apollonios refers to in order to show Medea’s feelings of pain as 
physically real. 
The discovery of the nervous system should be viewed as a result of physicians 
and philosophers’ attempts to understand the experience of bodily sensation; i.e., how it 
is that we feel pain and pleasure somatically, especially when in response to emotions?  
It also should be viewed in light of their attempts to understand voluntary and 
involuntary somatic movement. Both of these are tied to the hēgemonikon as it 
interpreted emotional pain and facilitated its manifestation as physical pain through the 
nervous system. The hēgemonikon received and interpreted impulses and delivered the 
message to the body to move.   
Praxagoras of Cos, Herophilos’ tutor and Chrusippos’ main influence, 
addressed the question of how voluntary movement worked. He posited that voluntary 
movement was transmitted from the heart (as the hēgemonikon) through arteries which 
contained psychic pneuma to the rest of the body.
224
 Praxagoras here employed the 
term neuron to describe the final part of the artery through which the motions were 
transmitted, and this is presumably because it resembled a sinew.
225
 Just as pneuma is 
realized as the mechanism behind the psyche, the psyche uses this mechanism to 
interact with body. The driving instrument behind all of the motions of the soul was 
considered to be pneuma, which rose in popularity between the time of Aristotle and 
Herophilos and was generally considered by both physicians and philosophers to be the 
instrument of the soul and the means through which it participated in sense-
perception.
226
 Aristotle was the first to consider aesthēsis ‘sense-perception’ as a 
function of the hēgemonikon and the Stoics also adapted this view.227   
                                                   
222 When he was away from Alexandria he had to rely on animal dissections, however Edelstein argues 
that when Galen did visit Alexandria he had access to human dissections; Edelstein (1967) 292. 
223 Longrigg (1993)  
224 Aristotle also credits pneuma for voluntary motions in his De Motu Animalium; for discussion see 
Cambiano (1999) 600. 
225 Longrigg (1993) 192. 
226 Tielman (1996) 171. 
227 Webb (1982) 27. 
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Herophilos, when he discovered the nervous system transferred to it the 
attribution of bodily movement and sense-perception. Herophilos, advancing on the 
work of his tutor, distinguished between the motor and sensory nerves. Both 
Erasistratos and Herophilos credited the nerves with the capability of voluntary motion 
and sensation (they called them aisthētika neura). Through dissections however, 
Herophilos determined that the hēgemonikon was the brain as the nervous system 
stemmed from it (Erasistratos agrees). In doing this Herophilos proved Aristotle’s 
theory that the processes occurred in one and the same organ, although Aristotle 
thought this happened in the heart and denied the brain any role in sense-perception. 
The discovery of a nervous system was ground-breaking for the Greeks’ understanding 
of human biology. This discovery would have revolutionised the Greeks’ perspective 
on pain and feeling, as they now knew there was this net-like system of nerves that 
stretched throughout the body which were responsible for producing the sensations we 
feel.  
I have already stated how Medea’s soul in the Argonautika is unified and 
located in the region of the heart. How then, does Apollonios manage to incorporate the 
nervous system whose existence seems to disprove the heart’s hegemony according to 
its discoverers? Apollonios follows Chrusippos’ more traditional view which still 
incorporates the new discovery but within the confines of maintaining that the heart is 
the hēgemonikon. The passage with the headache illustrates that the emotional suffering 
that affects the heart, as the seat of the psyche, is then transformed into physically ‘real’ 
pain that has its origins at the base of the head, the origin of the nervous system which 
carries movement and sensation to the whole body. In doing this he also hints at the 
views of people like Herophilos and Erasistratos by highlighting the importance that 
the brain plays in somatic sensation, and hinting at the possible hegemony of the brain.  
Ultimately however, Apollonios follows Chrusippos’ model, one where the heart is 
hēgemonikon and acts as the stimulus for the physical pain.  
The emphasis that Apollonios places on the area of the base of the brain and its 
role in this system of sense-perception acknowledges contemporary medical views that 
the hēgemonikon resides there. Although the dominant trend in philosophical thought 
throughout the Classical and Hellenistic Period was that the controlling seat of the 
psyche was the heart, the argument for the brain’s hegemony remained strong. The 
debate between whether the heart or the head was the organ with the capacity for 
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consciousness, sensation and knowledge was  debated by  physicians, philosophers and 
scientists ceaselessly even up to the Renaissance. A line of people that included 
Aristotle, Praxagoras, Zeno, Chrusippos and the Stoics attributed these faculties to the 
heart. And indeed, poetically and culturally speaking, the heart was traditionally this 
seat. Alcmaeon, the Pythagoreans, Hippocrates, Plato, Herophilos, Erasistratos and 
later, Galen, on the other hand, prescribed to the theory that the brain possessed these 
faculties. In Galen’s treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato this issue takes 
pride of place, which attests to its topicality even in his era.
228
 The primacy of the 
heart’s role in decision-making, emotion, sensation and reaction are evidenced 
continually throughout the Argonautika and are concentrated in Book 3. This cardio-
centricity is due to many influences. Apollonios’ primary model for the physiology of 
mind and body is Chrusippos’ – and Chrusippos was a strong advocate for the cardio-
centric model and used poetry as evidence. 
Chrusippos quotes Homer and the tragedians extensively, using their language and 
ways of describing and explaining emotion as fountains of truth. This is one of the 
striking similarities between Apollonios and Chrusippos as their influences and 
interests are so similar that it is not unreasonable to assume that Apollonios would have 
seen in Chrusippos a relatable interest in epic, lyric, tragedy and philosophy. Also, the 
poetic tradition is one of cardio-centricity, as was the general public opinion.
229
 It 
would be a great shift, perhaps a somewhat unintelligible one, if Apollonios were to 
associate emotions with the brain, for even Herophilos and Erasistratos, whose 
discovery of the nervous system was the most compelling evidence up to that point in 
antiquity in favour of an enkephalo-centric model of body and psyche never said 
anything specifically about its role in emotions.
230
 Even Galen discussed emotions as 
affecting the heart and conceded that this is because the heart departs most from its 
natural state when affected by passions (i.e. an increased pulse; De Placitis III 5.43-
44).
231
 One of Galen’s main criticisms of Chrusippos was his ineptitude to take up 
Herophilos and Erasistratos’ advancements, and, in the face of ‘undeniable’ evidence 
not only retain cardio-centricity but argue for it by using what he considers quite 
unscientific reasoning. Although his criticisms are perhaps a bit harsh as the Stoic 
                                                   
228 Tielman (1996) xxiii. 
229 See Tielman (1996) 169ff. 
230 Although Tielman finds this likely (1996) 169. 
231 Tielman (1969) 169. 
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system of sense-perception was fairly analogous with a nervous system already; the 
Stoic psyche was categorized as having eight parts; the five senses, reproduction and 
the hēgemonikon,232 and Long argues that the psyche’s involvement in these operations 
emphasised its diffusion through the body and the multiplicity of the functions it was in 
control of. The faculties that Plato deemed composite in a psyche are all unified in the 
hēgemonikon, and the other parts are purely instruments of its activity and enable 
movement and sense-perception.
233
 This model bears close enough resemblance to a 
nervous system that the slight alteration of Chrusippos’ own model to incorporate the 
new discovery does not in fact really compromise the integrity of his own system: he is 
able to alter it only slightly to make his model, one where the heart as hēgemonikon 
registers emotional pain and delivers this to the body through a nervous-system like 
structure as somatic sensation.
234
 In addition, because the heart was the recognized 
locus of emotions his determination that the heart was the hēgemonikon was the more 
believable argument when it came to understanding the psychosomatic relationship of 
emotional pain. Chrusippos relies heavily on etymology, folklore and poetic tradition 
for endorsing cardio-centricity.
235
 For example, he discusses the etymology of kardia, 
and says that it is derived from kratia which denotes its supreme power over the body 
(De Placitis III 5.28). He also argues that because we nod our head downwards when 
we say ego that we look in the direction of where our mind and hēgemonikon is (De 
Placitis III 5.25).  Chrusippos also argues that ‘speech passes through the windpipe. If 
it were passing from the brain, it would not pass through the windpipe. Speech passes 
through the same region as discourse. Discourse passes from the mind. Therefore, the 
mind is not the brain’ (De Placitis II 5.7-8).236  Chrusippos argues in favour of this 
tradition and says that most men perceive emotion to be in the heart, because that is 
where it is felt (De Placitis III 5.2-5).
237
 In particular, he identifies the feeling of love as 
arising in the heart (De Placitis II 7.10-12), and Medea seems to have this self-
                                                   
232 cf. Heirocles, Col 7.5.10; Sen, Ep 14.8. 
233 Long (1996) 242. 
234 Graver believes that with a better working knowledge of the nervous system a Stoic should have no 
problem in transferring to the brain the role that Chrusippos gave to the heart; Graver (2007) 23.  
235 See De Lacy (2005) 177-187. See also Padel (1996) 18 for examples of the heart acting as the centre 
of impulse, as a mind, and its movements in Greek literature; for examples of the roles of the thumos, 
phrēn and prapides see 20-30.  
236 cf. De Placitis II  5.27-60; Diog. Laert., Lives II. 5.57-60; parallel in the Argonautika 3.681-7. 
237 For a discussion on how passion is described as felt in the heart in Greek literature see Padel (1996) 
19. 
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awareness when she diagnoses her own pain as being in her heart (3.644).
238
 This 
appeal to general conviction was used as a trump card of sorts.
239
 
Although Apollonios ultimately models Medea on Chrusippos’ model, he does 
hint at other contemporary views through his reference to the occiput (inion). It is 
important to note that even among those who held the view that the brain was the 
hēgemonikon there was disagreement as to where exactly in the brain this existed.240 It 
was Aristotle who first differentiated the cerebrum, the larger frontal part of the brain, 
from the cerebellum, the smaller section at the back, and the differentiation between the 
two was crucial in later anatomical research on the brain, as different physicians located 
the hēgemonikon in different anatomical locations of the brain; ‘concerning the 
command centre, Plato and Democritus locate it in the entire head; Strato in the space 
between the eyebrows; Erasistratos in the area of the meninx of the brain which he calls 
‘on the skull’; and Herophilos in the ventricle of the brain which is also its base (basis)’ 
(Galen, De Historia Philosophia 28). Apollonios was aware of the contemporary 
medical works of Herophilos who assigned control of the body to the fourth ventricle in 
the cerebellum, which directly correlates with the locus of the occiput (inion). The term 
‘basis’ which Herophilos uses for base of the brain, seems synonymous with the 
location of the inion ‘occiput’. Herophilos states that ‘all the nerves of the body grow 
either from the cerebellum or from the spinal marrow’ (Galen, De Usu Partium 8.11). 
This finds parallels in how the ines branch out from the inion, and in highlighting the 
inion as the epicentre of somatic sensation Apollonios hints at Herophilos’ theory that 
the hēgemonikon was in this area, not the heart.241 
                                                   
238 An important tenet to the Stoics is that humans have an innate ability to understand themselves and 
their own condition. Chrusippos says ‘the first thing appropriate to every animal from the moment of 
birth is its own constitution and the consciousness of this’ (Diog. Laert., Lives 7.85); cf. Hierocles, Col 
44-53; Long (1996) 236. In addition, it is through pneuma that humans are able to continuously perceive 
themselves (Heirocles, Col 4.38-53); cf. Medea says, ‘my heart is buffeted around by worry for your 
children’ (περί μοι παίδων σέο θυμὸς ἄηται 3.688). 
239 Tielman (1996) 168. 
240 Chrusippos modestly admits that anatomy seems to have largely failed in the endeavour of exposing 
where the hēgemonikon resides for its real location eludes everybody: ‘Thus the place seems to elude us, 
since we have either a clear perception (of it), as we had with the others, nor sure signs from which the 
matter might be inferred; otherwise disagreement among physicians and philosopher would not have 
grown so great’ (Galen, De Placitis III 1.9-15). This is why he resorts to other, less scientific means of 
argumentation; he is no anatomist and admits to it. 
241 Both inion and ines are derived from the Greek word is, which means strength or force. The close 
proximity of these words, in fact they exist in the same line, emphasises the great strength and dynamism 
that exists in the localised area of the base of the head. Apollonios’ clever wordplay (it is almost a form 
of polyptoton) here enables him to convey the debated dynamism of this area.  
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Apollonios discusses the exact nature of the relationship between the head, the 
heart and the nerves in this headache passage to show his interest in the contemporary 
discussion and heighten the realism of the pain that spreads across Medea’s body and 
centres in her head. The references to Herophilos’ theory that the hēgemonikon resides 
in the brain may tempt us to say that Apollonios himself prescribed to an enkephalo-
centric model of the body and soul. However, this idea is thwarted by the undeniable 
primacy of the heart’s role in Medea as the organ that feels and reacts to the emotion, 
and in this passage it is the stimulus for the emotional pain travelling through the 
nervous system to manifest as physical pain. The pain that Medea feels occurs 
‘whenever the tireless Erotes should hurl sorrows upon her heart’. The heart is the first 
point of contact and it is the primary locus of emotions.  Apollonios’ incorporation of 
contemporary models in his description of Medea’s pain enables him to physically 
show Medea’s emotional anguish manifest realistically as somatic pain. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this thesis has discussed, Apollonios constructs Medea’s psyche and body in 
response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to portray 
more realistically than anyone before him the way that erōs manifests itself in Medea 
as symptoms of both mental illness and physical sickness. Apollonios does this to 
heighten the realism of Medea’s physical and psychological pain and pleasure while 
simultaneously providing a forceful warning of the destructiveness of erōs. Apollonios 
realistically portrays the enticing romantic delight of the glukos, while simultaneously 
magnifying the pikros aspect of desire to the extreme. The extent of this amplification 
is better understood having discerned Apollonios’ allusions to contemporary theories 
on sense-perception and pain. His detailed treatment of Medea’s internal workings 
represents how the pathos manifests and alters the psyche on the biological level. 
Apollonios is able to transfer the destructive and terrifying attributes of Erōs into 
Medea’s very psyche where it disrupts her internal balances of pneuma and fire to 
manifest as equally terrifying behaviour and debilitating sickness through the image of 
Eros as archer firing the bolt into Medea’s heart.  Eros acts as a daimōn, providing a 
traditional explanation of divine intervention for disease and manic behaviour. The 
gadfly also bears associations of disease and mental illness which are able to manifest 
in Medea through the bolt, which transfers erōs and all his attributions to Medea’s 
psyche. This is the set-up which Apollonios provides to henceforth explain Medea’s 
symptomology along more scientific lines of natural causation. Apollonios thus blends 
traditional views of divine causation that resonate in epic poetry with contemporary 
medical and philosophical views of natural causation to provide a construction of 
Medea which very much represents the current conceptions of a psychological make-up 
and its affections and expressions. Apollonios represents an example of the Hellenistic 
scholar’s interest in characterization and psychology. His depiction of Medea’s 
psychological turmoil and indecision is sometimes criticised as inconsistent and 
unbelievable, because her demeanour and characterization so drastically changes at the 
beginning of Book 4. however, this reading fails to recognise the premise that Medea’s 
personality contains both her virginal and sorceress sides as integrated halves at the 
same time, and it is this reveal/ concealment of these characteristics which keeps the 
psychological vacillation of Medea’s decision making realistic. This indecisiveness 
heightens the tension of the decision-making process as it keeps the audience in 
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suspense as to what Medea will choose to do, even though we already know that she 
will choose Jason. Apollonios uses Medea’s behaviour to allude to her dormant sinister 
tendencies like her passionate, angry and murderous nature, her ability to manipulate 
men and her sinister sorceress’ pharmaka. However, this decision is made all the harder 
by the strength with which Medea clings to her values, and this exposition of a young, 
inexperienced Medea having to choose between two life-altering decisions is truly one 
which evokes sympathy in the audience for her, yet also casts unforgettable 
recollections of Euripides’ Medea in the future making an equally life-altering decision 
and suggests that as in that situation, so in this one too, Medea will be overcome by her 
need to gratify her desire and act against right reason in order to pursue Jason.  
Apollonius on several occasions, at significant moments, tactfully hints at the 
future developments in the myth of Medea and foretells that Medea will ultimately be a 
survivor, valuing self-preservation and self-gratification more than familial ties. This is 
because her pathos affects her psyche’s very ability to act in accordance with right 
reason. The Stoics deem right reason to be the kind of actions which a wise-man is 
wont to do, and include for example, acts of loyalty to one's parents, brothers and 
homeland.  It is this very conundrum, whereby a person is able to be aware of the thing 
which is best to do and which is according to reason, yet still act in opposition to this 
which the philosophers discussed as akrasia. Both Euripides’ Medea and Apollonios’ 
Medea acknowledge that to act in accordance with their passion is wrong and will lead 
to terrifying consequences (kaka), and in an attempt to stand by this deliberation 
admonish themselves against the object of desire, yet still happily and ecstatically 
pursue it, while simultaneously recognizing that this is wrong.  This was, to the 
philosophers, a type of mental illness that needed to be cured by therapeutics, however 
instead of unguents and dietetics they prescribed philosophy, ethics and knowledge. 
The employment of knowledge, for example, alleviates the pathos. This concept was 
conceived within somatic terminology, as the psyche was now considered to be 
corporeal and the mind’s affections were acknowledged to be able to manifest 
physically as both erratic behaviour and physical sickness. The physicalization of the 
soul was described in terms of pneumatic tonos and flow. A pathos is literally an upset 
(ptoia) in the pneumatic tension of the psyche, and the degree of tautness of this tension 
correlates to the person’s mental strength and resolve to act in accordance with reason.  
Pathē disrupt this and compromise the psyche’s ability to receive, interpret and act on 
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information rationally, because they enhance in them weak-will. Some people, 
unfortunately, already naturally have weak-will like barbarians, lovers and fools. It is in 
this way that through the utilization of contemporary theories Apollonios is able to 
reveal to a modern audience the degree to which an ancient audience would have 
considered his Medea as medically compromised by her pathē, and thus more 
sympathetic. Chrusippos and Apollonios are both interested in how it came about that 
Medea was so affected by her pathos that she betrayed her family and homeland. 
According to Chrusippos’ model, the psyche is unified and represents what we could 
call a ‘mind’ and as a unified whole, the hēgemonikon is endowed with the Platonic 
faculties, oscillates between acting in accordance with reason and in accordance with 
the pathos. To him it was not two elements of Medea’s psyche that rise to battle one 
another for governance of the body, but the person as a whole involved fully in the 
decision making, sequentially expressing ideas, and it is this which represents the swift 
vacillation that Chrusippos describes. As a result of a unified psyche, the agent has 
more responsibility over his actions. Although the lover is granted more agency and is 
thus held more morally accountable for his actions, the lover must nevertheless be 
judged in light of his medical limitations.  
Just as Medea’s psyche is disturbed by the inception of erōs, which manifests as 
manic behaviour and immobilizing indecision, so too does the disruption of Medea’s 
psyche manifest physically. Eros as a pathos interacts with the balance of internal heat 
to create fever, the symptoms of which include flushes on the skin, rapid movements of 
the eyes and body, and a palpitating heart. The pathos is able to manifest physically 
because of the corporealization of the psyche, whereby it is completely diffused 
throughout the body and its effects manifest also as affections of the body, and vice 
versa. Because of this, pathē became medicalized and were able to be diagnosed and 
prescribed treatment. This sympathetic relationship between mind and body had been 
recognized earlier and advanced on in the pseudo-science physiognomy, which held the 
tenet that from outward physical characteristics we are able to gain valuable insight into 
the psychological characteristics that are otherwise unperceivable. The physiognomists 
were in particular interested in what the skin, voice, eyes, gait and expressions had to 
reveal about internal psychological activity. Apollonios magnifies the treatment of 
these characteristics and their importance in expressing characterization. According to 
physiognomy, for example, the blush signifies desire, anger, impudence and the 
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abandonment of shame, for it also marks the beginning of decisions that have serious 
moral consequences. Medea’s combating feelings of desire and fear are expressed 
through the alternating blush and pallor that comes upon her cheeks. In addition, 
Apollonios accentuates the focus on the eyes, and their movements are representative 
of the psyche’s activity. The eyes signify desire, anger, modesty, boldness and 
contemplation. When the eyes are stationary they reflect indecision, when moving 
rapidly they reflect restlessness, and when they are cast sideways in an attempt to catch 
a glimpse of the beloved they reflect sexual voracity. A major function of physiognomy 
was to predict what kind of behaviour people are most likely to exhibit, and Apollonios 
uses this function to associate Medea’s blushes, for instance, with a tendency for 
impassioned behaviour, and Apollonios once again toys with the audience’s image of 
Medea. Another function of physiognomy was to explain the cause behind the effects, 
as there were restrictions on entering the body and external symptomology was the only 
means to interpret the internal unseen ‘felt’.  The blush is thus, also a symptom of 
fever, the cause of which is increased internal heat, stoked by the breezes of the Erotes. 
The fire that burns in Medea’s heart is shown raging in full blaze, and according to 
Aristotle, the hotter the fever the hotter the flush and in consequence, the more manic 
the behaviour. In addition, Medea also exhibits symptoms of fever in her eyes, as when 
a mist descends over them in her moments of pure ecstatic delight, Apollonios evokes 
imagery of fever and death to oppose the pikros with the glukos.   It is the presence of 
Jason which reignites this fever and his associations with Sirius also enable his fever-
like wantonness to manifest in Medea as well. The effect of Medea’s pathos is also 
seen in an accelerated pulsed, also another symptom of her fever.  Through reference to 
Medea’s palpitating pulse Apollonios engages in the contemporary discussion on the 
circulatory system.  Herophilos and Erasistratos both employed pulse analysis to 
diagnose and treat fever and the presence of pathē and the account of Antiochus’ illness 
which Erasistratos famously diagnoses bears striking similarities to Medea’s 
symptomology.  In addition, Apollonios heightens the realism of his construction of 
Medea’s heart by alluding to Erasistratos’ revolutionary discovery of the heart’s 
pumping role in pulsation. And lastly, this thesis looked at how Apollonios allowed 
Medea’s emotional anguish to manifest as real perceivable somatic pain through his 
incorporation of the nervous system. He engages in the contemporary dialogue of 
sense-perception and the location of the hēgemonikon, and while he seems to subscribe 
to Chrusippos’ more traditional model where the heart is hēgemonikon, he also 
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acknowledges the role of the base of the brain in the functioning of the newly 
discovered nervous system. The heart, as locus of the hēgemonikon and where 
emotions are felt, interpreted and judged upon, is the stimulus behind the transfer of 
emotional pain to physical pain which diffuses through the body by means of the 
nervous system. In a remarkable effort he describes how it can be that we feel physical 
pain because of our emotions.  
Apollonios thus presents on the whole a very pessimistic portrayal of the 
experience of love. He parallels the destructive cosmic Eros who wants the cosmos as 
his play thing with the destructive pathē that affect all people and are as inevitable as 
fate itself. These pathē incite emotional and physical illness and strife. Apollonios 
heightens the pikros element of erōs to provide a forceful warning of its consequences 
in alignment with Stoic ethical philosophy, yet also acknowledges the glukos element 
which is undeniably present in the experience of love, and the sweetness of this feeling 
is what makes pathē so incredibly irresistible.  
This thesis is important because it provides a unique perspective on Medea’s 
pathos, and as a result, her erratic behaviours. Although these behaviours serve as a 
terrifying warning to the dangers of pathē Apollonios provides to his modern audience 
insight into how his ancient audience would have viewed Medea’s erratic behaviour as 
a consequence of her medical limitations. In this way, Apollonios sympathizes with 
Medea more so than any of his antecedents. This represents a Hellenistic focus on the 
affections of the everyday person, and thus, how an ordinary person copes with them.  
This thesis begins to track the popularity of medically and philosophically held 
tenets and the social response to these beliefs, through the appearances of them in 
contemporary literature. This is very effective when looking at the intertextuality 
between the arts and science in the ancient world. The appropriation of contemporary 
material in order to heighten the realism of his text is typical of a progressive 
Alexandrian scholar, and through Apollonios’ utilization of them he provides insight 
into his perspective on psychological issues such as akrasia. Through studying how 
Medea is constructed physiologically and psychologically and the ethical expectations 
that are put upon her, we are better able to interpret how Medea’s character functions in 
the poem as a whole. This type of investigation, I believe, could also provide insight 
into other texts that deal with similar psychopathological themes.  
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Because of limitations regarding space, I was unable to discuss everything I would 
have liked to in this thesis. As a result I believe there are many areas of research which 
are still to be done in relation to this thesis. For example, Medea is also undoubtedly 
affected by liquids in the descriptions of her desire, and in this Apollonios enters the 
scientific realm of humoral psychology, i.e. the way that internal flux and imbalance of 
the humors affects psychological behaviour and induces states like melancholy. In 
addition, a further investigation into Apollonios’ role as physician when clinically 
depicting and diagnosing Medea in relation to the Stoic concept of a ‘spectator’ is also 
warranted to further elucidate Apollonios’ incorporation of Stoic psychopathology in 
his depiction of Medea.  
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